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A “DIGNIFIED LIFE” AND THE RESURGENCE OF
SOCIAL RIGHTS
By Thomas M. Antkowiak1*
ABSTRACT—The international human rights movement and its
institutions have faced searing criticism that they have abandoned social,
economic, and cultural rights (“social rights”). While favorable treaties and
constitutions have proliferated over the last decades, grave poverty,
inequality, and disease still run rampant across the globe. Many have
attributed the latest rise of demagogues and terrorist groups to this
widespread social disenfranchisement.
The supranational human rights courts have historically avoided social
rights enforcement due to limited subject-matter jurisdiction. Yet more
recently the Inter-American Court of Human Rights introduced a conceptual
breakthrough to assess social rights, which was affirmed by the U.N. Human
Rights Committee at the end of 2018. These advances reveal a building,
although controversial, movement among supranational tribunals to hold
States accountable for ensuring a “dignified life” and various social rights.
In Parts I and II, this article will examine these international legal
developments, which primarily involve the integration of social rights into
the right to life. In Part III, the article will then assess this expansive rightto-life approach, considering its consensual, suprapositive, and institutional
aspects. When these three aspects are balanced, a court’s interpretation
contributes to making its treaty system “justifiable, politically acceptable,
and effective.”
The Inter-American Court has recognized that the fundamental right to
life will never be meaningful and effective without nutrition, water, health
care, housing, education, and ancestral lands. By establishing that these
elements are indivisible from life, the Court also justified its expansion of
remedies to safeguard many individuals and communities at risk. While
States originally did not draft this “right to a dignified life,” they have
1* Associate Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law. I thank Paolo Carozza, Jorge
Contesse, Bernard Duhaime, Gerald Neuman, Matiangai Sirleaf, and Alejandra Gonza for their valuable
comments on previous drafts. Also, I appreciate the helpful feedback received during presentations at the
Notre Dame Law School faculty workshop, the ASIL-Midwest colloquium, and the ASIL Annual
Meeting panel, “Regional Human Rights Bodies as Instruments of International Law.”
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permitted it to develop in the Inter-American System, as it aligns with their
emphasis—at least in principle—on human dignity and respectable living
conditions. The article concludes that the right to a dignified life, despite
certain drawbacks examined, is a sensible approach to protect several
intertwined rights, because it reasonably balances consensual, suprapositive,
and institutional factors. If the Inter-American Court remains committed to
its development, the evolving right to a dignified life will become
increasingly protective, as well as progressively influential for both
supranational tribunals and national legal institutions.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
A.

Overview

The international human rights movement and its institutions have
faced searing criticism that they have abandoned social, economic, and
cultural rights (“social rights”). While relevant treaties, favorable
constitutions, and human rights attorneys have proliferated over the last
decades, grave poverty, inequality, and disease still run rampant across the
globe. Many have attributed the latest rise of demagogues and terrorist
groups to this widespread social disenfranchisement.2

2 See, e.g., ROBERT KUTTNER, CAN DEMOCRACY SURVIVE GLOBAL CAPITALISM? (2018); Caleb
Crain, Is Capitalism a Threat to Democracy?, THE NEW YORKER (May 7, 2018), available at
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/05/14/is-capitalism-a-threat-to-democracy; Social Charter
of the Americas, AG/doc.5242/12 rev. 2, art. 1 (Sept. 20, 2012) (“Development with equity strengthens
and consolidates democracy, since the two are interdependent and mutually reinforcing.”); Eur. Parl. Ass.,
Additional protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights concerning fundamental social rights,
3rd Sess., Doc. No. 8357 (1999) (“If democracy is to be firmly rooted in Europe, it is necessary to
guarantee greater effectiveness and greater enforceability of social rights.”).
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Historically, the major supranational human rights courts, such as the
European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, have avoided social rights enforcement due to limited subject-matter
jurisdiction. Yet more recently the Inter-American Court introduced a
conceptual breakthrough to assess social rights, which was affirmed by the
United Nations Human Rights Committee at the end of 2018. These
advances reveal a building, although controversial, movement among
supranational tribunals to hold States accountable for ensuring a “dignified
life” and various social rights.
In Parts I and II, this article will examine these international legal
developments, which primarily involve the integration of social rights into
the right to life. In Part III, the article will then assess this expansive rightto-life approach through Gerald Neuman’s useful theoretical lens—
considering the approach’s consensual, suprapositive, and institutional
aspects. When these three aspects are balanced, a court’s interpretation
contributes to making its treaty system “justifiable, politically acceptable,
and effective.”3
With its innovative judgments, the Inter-American Court has
recognized that the fundamental right to life will never be meaningful and
effective without nutrition, water, health care, housing, education, and
ancestral lands. By establishing that these elements are indivisible from life,
the Court also justified its expansion of remedies to safeguard the lives and
dignity of many individuals and communities at risk. While States originally
did not draft this right to a dignified life, they have permitted it to develop in
the Inter-American System, as it aligns with their emphasis—at least in
principle—on human dignity and respectable living conditions. The article
concludes that the right to a dignified life, despite certain drawbacks
examined, is a sensible approach to protect several intertwined rights,
because it reasonably balances consensual, suprapositive, and institutional
factors. If the Inter-American Court remains committed to its development,
the evolving right to a dignified life will become increasingly protective, as
well as progressively influential for both supranational tribunals and national
legal institutions.
B.

Background

After the Second World War, the adoption of both the American
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man and the Universal Declaration

3
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of Human Rights inaugurated a new era for the promotion of human rights.4
These founding texts recognized civil and political rights, as well as social,
economic and cultural rights, and placed them all on the same plane: “human
beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief, and freedom from fear and
want.”5 The various rights were established as universal, equal, and
indivisible.
However, in the following years, a world polarized by the Cold War
divided these rights between two treaties: the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights6 (“ICESCR”), and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights7 (“ICCPR”).8 Nations endorsing a
capitalist and market-driven economy dismissed many social rights as mere
goals.9 The two Covenants themselves set out distinct obligations: while
States can “progressively” achieve social rights, civil and political rights
must be implemented immediately.10 In international law, social rights have
not yet recovered from this fall from grace.
Still, recent decades have seen the adoption of numerous global and
regional treaties that recognize social rights and develop their content. From
the United Nations, these include, among others, the Convention on the
Rights of the Child,11 the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities,12 and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of

4 Organization of American States, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S.
Doc.OEA/Ser.L.V/II.92, doc. 31 rev. 3 (May 2, 1948); G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). See generally LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990).
5 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble (Dec. 10, 1948).
6 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 95–19, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [ICESCR].
7 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95–20, 6
I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [ICCPR].
8 See, e.g., Ioana Cismas, The Intersection of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and Civil and
Political Rights, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND CHALLENGES (Eibe Riedel, Gilles Giacca, and Christophe Golay eds.,
2014) (“[W]hile the West may have been responsible for the partition, it was the East that robbed the
ICESCR of its expert monitoring and individual communication procedure.”); Vratislav Pechota, The
Development of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 32, 42 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981) (explaining that “the
atmosphere [for treaty negotiation] was poisoned by the political tensions.”).
9 See, e.g., SAMUEL MOYN, NOT ENOUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD 217 (2018) (The
United States “has consistently rejected economic and social rights.”); Philip Alston, Putting Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights Back on the Agenda of the United States, in THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
122–35 (William F. Schulz ed., 2008) (describing how US administrations have considered social,
economic and cultural norms to be “goods” or goals rather than actual rights).
10 ICESCR, supra note 6, art. 2(1).
11 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
12 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3.
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Indigenous Peoples.13 Key instruments have also been introduced at the
regional level, such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union,14 the Revised European Social Charter,15 the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights,16 the Additional Protocol to the American
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights,17 and the Inter-American Convention on Protecting the Human
Rights of Older Persons.18
Further, national constitutions around the world have incorporated
social rights. Rights to education, trade unions, health care, social security,
child welfare, and environmental protection appear in over half of the
world’s constitutions.19 In about seventy percent of all constitutions at least
one social right is designated as justiciable by national courts, and around
one quarter of constitutions recognize ten or more justiciable social rights.20
Tribunals in Colombia, India, Kenya, and South Africa, among others, have
issued trailblazing judgments interpreting these rights.21
Nevertheless, social rights continue to suffer broad neglect. According
to Philip Alston, the “great majority of States” fail to implement social rights
effectively, even if they are featured in constitutional texts.22 Legislators
often fail to enact these norms into statutes, and many national courts resist
interpreting the rights, even when they are recognized by law.23

13 G.A. Res. 61/295, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13,
2007); 46 I.L.M. 1013 (2007).
14 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, opened for signature Oct. 2, 2000, 40
I.L.M. 265 (entered into force Dec. 7, 2000).
15 European Social Charter (revised), May 3, 1996, 163 E.T.S.
16 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 (entered into
force Oct. 21, 1986).
17 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (“Protocol of San Salvador”), O.A.S.T.S. No. 69, 28 I.L.M. 156 (Nov. 16,
1999).
18 Inter-American Convention on Protecting the Human Rights of Older Persons, June 15, 2015, 55
I.L.M. 989 (entered into force Jan. 11, 2017).
19 Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights), Report of the Special
Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/31 (Apr. 28, 2016)
[hereinafter Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty].
20 Id.
21 See, e.g., Constitutional Court of Colombia, decision T-025 of 2004, available in Spanish at
www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2004/t-025-04.htm (Colombia); People’s Union for Civil
Liberties v. Union of India & Others, W.P. No. 196/2001 (India); Ibrahim Sangor Osman and Others v.
the Hon. Minister of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security and Others (2011) K.L.R.
(H.C.K.) (Kenya); Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA
46 (CC) (S. Afr.).
22 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty, supra note 19, ¶ 11.
23 Id. ¶ 4.
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International adjudication of social rights is even more limited. In 2008,
the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR was adopted; this instrument grants the
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights the
competence to decide complaints alleging violations of Covenant rights.24
But, over a decade later, there are only 24 States Parties to the Optional
Protocol, and the Committee has issued very few decisions.25 As for Europe,
the European Committee of Social Rights interprets the European Social
Charter, but only 15 nations have conceded jurisdiction to its complaints
mechanism.26 The Inter-American and African27 human rights systems lack
comparable bodies that specialize in social rights litigation.28
International human rights advocates also share blame for the secondclass status of social rights. For decades, the major human rights
organizations emphasized civil and political rights, “turning a blind eye to
galloping material inequality.”29 Aryeh Neier—one of the most influential
figures in the modern rights movement and founder of Human Rights
Watch30—considered social rights to be “dangerous,” because affording
24 G.A. Res. 63/117, annex, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (Dec. 10, 2008).
25 For ratification information, see Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, U.N. HUMAN
RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R, http://indicators.ohchr.org (last visited Dec. 29, 2019).
26 See Collective Complaints Procedure, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://www.coe.int/en/web/europeansocial-charter/collective-complaints-procedure (last visited Dec. 29, 2019). Note that, while many
Council of Europe States have ratified the European Social Charter or the Revised Social Charter, these
treaties permit States to recognize only a portion of the enumerated rights.
27 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights contains numerous social, economic, and
cultural rights that can be interpreted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Other relevant instruments in the region include the
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, as well
as the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, which has its own monitoring mechanism,
the Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. Protocol to the African Charter on
Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, Org. of African Unity [OAU] AHG/Res.
240 (XXXI), opened for signature July 11, 2003 (entered into force Nov. 25, 2005). African Charter on
the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Org. of African Unity [OAU] Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49, adopted July
1, 1990 (entered into force Nov. 29, 1999).
28 Below the Article discusses how the Inter-American Court adjudicates social rights, in addition to
civil and political rights.
29 MOYN, supra note 9, at 176. See also Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty, supra
note 19, ¶ 11 (“This marginality manifests itself . . . in the work of many of the most prominent civil
society groups focusing on human rights.”); PAUL FARMER, PATHOLOGIES OF POWER: HEALTH, HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND THE NEW WAR ON THE POOR 9–10 (2004) (stating that the “hesitation of many in the human
rights community” to act on social rights amounts to a “failure . . . to address the urgent needs” of the
poor.); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Reparations Decisions and Dilemmas, 27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
157, 191 (2004) (transitional justice organizations “have often given short shrift to economic, social and
cultural rights.”).
30 Aryeh Neier is president emeritus of the Open Society Foundations. He also served as executive
director of Human Rights Watch, which he helped found in 1978, and as national executive director of
the American Civil Liberties Union.
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them the same importance as civil and political rights “takes an area where
[political] compromise is essential and brings that into the process of rights
adjudication.”31
It is true that a new generation of rights advocates and civil society
organizations have taken up the mantle of social rights, fusing litigation
efforts with political engagement.32 Yet despite this building movement, and
the many favorable treaties and constitutions, clearly not enough has been
accomplished to protect social rights. In the face of global impoverishment
and inequality, Alston calls for concerted, deeper efforts to legally recognize
social rights, to establish “appropriate institutional arrangements” for their
promotion, and to ensure government accountability when the rights are
violated.33
C.

Approaches of Supranational Tribunals: Life and Social Rights

1. The Basics
The European Court, in operation since 1959, and Inter-American
Court, issuing merits decisions since 1987, generally enjoy authority and
prestige in their regions.34 Their binding jurisdiction primarily concerns the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms35 and the American Convention on Human Rights,36 respectively.
Like the ICCPR, these treaties focus upon civil and political rights, with

31

Aryeh Neier, Social and Economic Rights: A Critique, 13 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 1–2 (2006).
See, e.g., Elisa Massimino, Letter to the Editor, This Is the New American Human Rights
Movement, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/29/opinion/humanrights.html (describing “the new American human rights movement, fueled by activists who understand
that enforcement of rights—including economic, social and cultural rights—is an inherently political
fight.”); Caroline Bettinger-López, The Long Arc of Human Rights: A Case for Optimism, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS (May-June 2018). Amnesty International has expanded its efforts to protect social rights. See
AMNESTY
INT’L,
AMNESTY
INT’L
ANNUAL
REPORT
2018/19,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/6700/2018/en/ (“[T]his year’s report also shines a
spotlight on economic, social and cultural rights.”); Many Rights, Some Wrong, THE ECONOMIST (Mar.
22, 2007), https://www.economist.com/international/2007/03/22/many-rights-some-wrong (Amnesty’s
mission has “become broader and more ambitious, calling for . . . economic improvement.”).
33 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty, supra note 19, ¶ 21.
34 See, e.g., DAVID HARRIS, MICHAEL O’BOYLE, E.P. BATES, & CARLA BUCKLEY, HARRIS,
O’BOYLE & WARBRICK: LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 107 (4th ed. 2018)
[hereinafter HARRIS, O’BOYLE & WARBRICK]; THOMAS M. ANTKOWIAK & ALEJANDRA GONZA, THE
AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS (2017) [hereinafter ANTKOWIAK &
GONZA].
35 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention].
36 American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143 [hereinafter American
Convention].
32
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select exceptions.37 For its part, the United Nations Human Rights
Committee delivers non-binding, yet influential, interpretations of the
ICCPR through general comments, observations on state reports, and
decisions in individual cases.38
The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the newest regional
human rights tribunal, did not hand down its first judgment until the end of
2009.39 The African Court mainly interprets the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights, which, in addition to civil and political rights,
recognizes individual rights to work, health, education, and cultural life.40
The African Charter also establishes collective rights, including peoples’
rights to self-determination, to “economic, social and cultural development,”
and to “freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources.”41
2. The United Nations Human Rights Committee
Since 1982, the Human Rights Committee has stated that the right to
life “cannot properly be understood in a restrictive manner.”42 Mainly in its

37 For example, the ICCPR’s provisions on self-determination, freedom of thought, freedom of
association, and minority rights also refer to social, economic and cultural rights. See Martin Scheinin,
Human Rights Committee: Not Only a Committee on Civil and Political Rights, in SOCIAL RIGHTS
JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 540 (Malcolm
Langford ed., 2008); Craig Scott, Interdependence and Permeability of Human Rights Norms: Towards
a Partial Fusion of the International Covenants on Human Rights, 27 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 769, 771
(1989) (considering the extent to which rights in the ICESCR “permeate” the ICCPR). Further, the
Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms added the
right to education to the European Convention, among other rights. See Protocol to the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Mar. 20, 1952, 213
U.N.T.S. 264 (entered into force May 18, 1954).
38 See, e.g., MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR
COMMENTARY xxvii, 894 (2d ed., 2005) (noting that the Human Rights Committee’s decisions and
resolutions are authoritative but not binding under international law).
39 The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights was established by a protocol to the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Organization of African Unity (OAU), Protocol to the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and
Peoples’
Rights
(entered
into
force
Jan.
25,
2004),
available
at
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3f4b19c14.html. Though the Protocol entered into force in 2004, little
progress was made, and the first judgment was not issued until 2009. Yogogombaye v. Republic of
Senegal, Judgment, App. No. 001/2008, Afr. Comm’n H.P.R. (Dec. 15, 2009), available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/1-2008.pdf.
40 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217, arts. 15–17
(Oct. 21, 1986), http://www.humanrights.se/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/African-Charter-on-Humanand-Peoples-Rights.pdf.
41 Id. arts. 20–22.
42 U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 6: Article 6 (Right to Life), ¶ 5 (Apr. 30,
1982), in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights
Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I), 176–78 (May 27, 2008) [hereinafter General
Comment 6]; see also U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 2348/2014, Toussaint v. Canada,
¶ 11.3 (views adopted on 24 July 2018) [hereinafter Toussaint v. Canada].
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responses to the reports of State Parties, the Committee has interpreted the
ICCPR’s Article 6, the right to life, to include select socio-economic
elements.43 In this way, it has directed States to “take positive measures
required by [A]rticle 6 to address [the] serious problem” of homelessness.44
The Committee has called on States to provide all detained individuals with
necessary medical care and to regularly monitor detention conditions.45 It has
urged States “to eliminate malnutrition” and the spread of disease.46 In
addition, the Committee has observed that measures which restrict “access
to all basic and life-saving services such as food, health, electricity, water
and sanitation” jeopardize Article 6.47
In an individual case, Toussaint v. Canada, the Committee recently held
that State obligations to respect and ensure the right to life include
“reasonably foreseeable threats and life-threatening situations that can result
in loss of life.”48 That is, States can violate Article 6 even if these scenarios
do not lead to death. Further,
as a minimum States [P]arties have the obligation to provide access
to existing health care services that are reasonably available and
43

To protect social rights, the Human Rights Committee has used other ICCPR provisions as well,
such as the prohibition on torture and the right to privacy, family and home. See Scheinin, supra note 37,
at 540.
44 U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the H.R. Comm., Canada, ¶ 12, U.N.
Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.105 (Apr. 7 1999).
45
Communication No. 763/1997, Lantsov v. Russian Federation, ¶¶ 9.2–11 (views adopted on 26
March 2002); General Comment No. 36 (2018) on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, on the right to life, ¶ 25 [hereinafter General Comment 36]. See also Womah Mukong v.
Cameroon, Communication No. 458/1991, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991, ¶ 9.3 (1994) (setting out
minimum standards for detention conditions).
46 General Comment 6, supra note 42, ¶ 5. See also U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding
Observations of the H.R. Comm., Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/CO/72/PRK (Aug. 27, 2001) (“[T]he Committee remains seriously concerned about the lack of
measures by the State party to deal with the food and nutrition situation.”); U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
Concluding Observations of the H.R. Comm., Moldova, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/75/MDA (July 25,
2002) (“The State Party should take immediate steps to ensure that the conditions of detention within its
facilities comply with the standards set out in articles 6, 7 and 10 of the Covenant, including the prevention
of the spread of disease and the provision of appropriate medical treatment to persons who have
contracted diseases, either in prison or prior to their detention.”).
47 U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the fourth periodic report of Israel, ¶ 12,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4 (Nov. 21, 2014) (noting with concern that “the blockade [of the Gaza Strip]
continues to . . . negatively impact [] Palestinians’ access to all basic and life-saving services such as
food, health, electricity, water and sanitation.”). See also U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding
Observations of the Human Rights Comm., Israel, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/CO/3 (Sept. 3, 2010)
(“The Committee is concerned at water shortages disproportionately affecting the Palestinian population
of the West Bank, due to prevention of construction and maintenance of water and sanitation
infrastructure.”). The Human Rights Committee has also used interim measures to seek reconnection of
water sources. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Liliana Assenova Naidenova v. Bulgaria, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/106/D/2073/2011 (Nov. 27, 2012).
48 Toussaint v. Canada, supra note 42.
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accessible, when lack of access to the health care would expose a
person to a reasonably foreseeable risk [of death].49
However, this decision was uncommon.50 The Committee rarely has
developed the socio-cultural content of the right to life through its individual
communications procedure.51
In October of 2018, building on Toussaint, the Committee expanded the
boundaries of the right to life. Following three years of consultations and
drafting,52 the Committee approved General Comment No. 36 on the right to
life.53 It stated, in part:
The duty to protect life implies that States [P]arties should take
appropriate measures to address the general conditions in society
that may eventually give rise to direct threats to life or prevent
individuals from enjoying their right to life with dignity. These
general conditions may include high levels of criminal and gun
violence, . . . pervasive traffic and industrial accidents, . . .
degradation of the environment, . . . deprivation of land, territories
and resources of indigenous peoples, . . . the prevalence of life
threatening diseases, . . . extensive substance abuse, widespread
hunger and malnutrition and extreme poverty and homelessness
(emphasis added).54
The General Comment then explained that States should address these
“general conditions” through “measures designed to ensure access without
49

Id.
See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Cabal and Pasini v. Australia, ¶ 7.7, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/78/D/1020/2001 (Aug. 7 2003) (“The Committee considers that a failure to separate detainees
with communicable diseases from other detainees could raise issues primarily under articles 6, paragraph
1, and 10, paragraph 1.”).
51 See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a
component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this
context, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. A/71/310 (Aug. 8, 2016) (“The Committee’s recognition in its general comment
No. 6 and in periodic reviews that the right to life requires positive measures to address homelessness and
poverty stands in marked contrast with the absence of consideration of these obligations in [individual
communications].”) [hereinafter Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing]; Eibe Riedel,
The Right to Life and the Right to Health, in Particular the Obligation to Reduce Child Mortality, in THE
RIGHT TO LIFE 351, 354–55 (Christian Tomuschat, Evelyne Lagrange & Stefan Oeter eds., 2010)
(explaining that the Committee hardly ever deals with “broader” right-to-life issues and positive state
obligations in its individual cases).
52 During the drafting process, numerous States, experts, United Nations institutions, and civil
society organizations submitted observations. See Call for Comments on Article 6—Right to Life, U.N.
HUMAN
RIGHTS
OFFICE
OF
THE
HIGH
COMM’R,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/GC36-Article6Righttolife.aspx (last visited Nov. 11,
2019).
53 General Comment 36, supra note 45. This comment replaced the earlier general comments No. 6
and No. 14, adopted by the Committee in 1982 and 1984, respectively. Id. ¶ 1.
54 Id. ¶ 26.
50
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delay by individuals to essential goods and services such as food, water,
shelter, health-care, electricity and sanitation,” as well as “effective
emergency health services, emergency response operations . . . and social
housing programs,” among others.55 Thus, the Human Rights Committee has
extended State obligations and the substantive content for the right to life,
“underscoring” the “right to life with dignity.”56
The international legal precedent for this right, also known as the “right
to a dignified life,” is the seminal judgment Villagrán Morales v. Guatemala
from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.57 With the Villagrán
Morales line of cases, the Inter-American Court expands the right to life
(Article 4 of the American Convention) to include certain social, economic,
and cultural rights. As discussed in detail below, the Court has found Article
4 violations when individuals or communities lacked adequate water,
nutrition, health care, shelter, or education.
3. The European Court of Human Rights
In contrast, the European Court has resisted the expansion of the right
to life in this way. In fact, the Court has held that “neither Article 2 [the right
to life] nor any other provision of the [European] Convention can be
interpreted as conferring on an individual a right to enjoy any given standard
of living, or a right to obtain financial assistance from the State.”58 There is
scant case law on whether a State’s failure to provide housing may implicate
Article 2.59
Similarly, the European Court has avoided establishing a general right
of access to health care under Article 2, even when life is at risk.60 The Grand
Chamber has held that “issues such as the allocation of public funds in the
55

Id.
Human Rights Committee, Human Rights Committee adopts General Comment on the right to life
(Oct.
30,
2018),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23797&LangID=E (“The
General Comment sent a strong message against the narrow legal interpretation of the right to life . . .
and it underscored the right to life with dignity.”). See also Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate
Housing, supra note 51, ¶ 44 (stating that certain components, such as “the right to a dignified life,” could
“lay the foundation for a renewed commitment to a more expansive approach and the recognition of
positive obligations.”). Interestingly, a few months earlier the Human Rights Committee mentioned “a
life with dignity” without expressly naming it a right. Toussaint v. Canada, supra note 42.
57 Villagrán Morales v. Guatemala, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63, ¶ 191
(Nov. 19, 1999).
58 Wasilewski v. Poland, App. No. 32734/96, Admissibility, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 3 (1999),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-59101. Nevertheless, in Kutepov and Anikeyenko v. Russia, the
Court left open the possibility that an inadequate pension, if leading to a “real and immediate risk” to an
individual’s life, could “warrant the application of Article 2.” Kutepov and Anikeyenko v. Russia, App.
No. 68029/01, Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 62 (2005), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-70761.
59 See HARRIS, O’BOYLE & WARBRICK, supra note 34, at 216.
60 See id. at 215.
56
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area of healthcare are not a matter [for the Court],” choosing to defer to the
competent national authorities.61 Nevertheless, as established in other human
rights systems, given the vulnerable situation of individuals in State custody,
the State has direct responsibility for their “health and physical well-being,”
and must provide them “with the requisite medical assistance.”62
Further, the European Court requires States to regulate both public and
private hospitals in order to protect the lives of patients.63 However, it has
explained that only in “very exceptional circumstances” will health
professionals’ acts and omissions lead to a violation of Article 2.64 These
circumstances include when a patient’s life “is knowingly put in danger by
denial of access to life-saving emergency treatment.”65 Article 2 will also be
breached where “a systemic or structural dysfunction in hospital services
results in a patient being deprived of access to life-saving emergency
treatment, and the authorities knew or ought to have known about that risk”
and failed to prevent it.66 Thus, the bar to an Article 2 violation in this context
is high; yet denial of medical treatment is one of the few situations67 where
the Court finds social rights to implicate the right to life.68
61 Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal, App. No. 56080/13, Judgement, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 175
(2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-179556.
62 Gorelov v. Russia, App. No. 49072/11, Judgement, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 42 (2014),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-139931. See also Slimani v. France, No. 57671/00, 2004‑IX
(extracts) Eur. Ct. H.R ¶ 27, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-61944.
63 Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal, App. No. 56080/13, Judgement, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 166. See
also Oyal v. Turkey, App. No. 4864/05, Judgement, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 54 (2010),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-97848.
64 Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal, App. No. 56080/13, Judgement, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 190.
65 Id. ¶ 191. The European Court notes that the situation “does not extend to circumstances where a
patient is considered to have received deficient, incorrect or delayed treatment.” Id. A refusal to release
a sick prisoner that results in a reduction of his or her life expectancy may raise an issue under Article 2.
Grice v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22564/93, Judgement, Eur. Ct. H.R (1994).
66 Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal, App. No. 56080/13, Judgement, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 192. For
example, in Asiye Genç v. Turkey, a prematurely-born baby died in an ambulance while being transferred
from one hospital to another. The Court concluded that the State had breached Article 2 for failing to
adequately provide for and coordinate emergency care and neonatal facilities in the area’s hospitals. Asiye
Genç v. Turkey, App. No. 24109/07, Judgement, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 87 (2015),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-151025. In Nencheva and Others v. Bulgaria, 15 young persons died
during the winter in their state-run facility for disabled youth, because authorities did not furnish sufficient
medical care, food, and heat. The Court found the State responsible for violating Article 2, due to
“exceptional circumstances” that took the case beyond a health professional’s mere “error of judgment.”
The judgment is not available in English; for a summary, see HARRIS, O’BOYLE & WARBRICK, supra
note 34, at 215.
67 See Liam Thornton, The European Convention on Human Rights: A Socio-Economic Rights
Charter?, in IRELAND AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: 60 YEARS AND BEYOND
233 (Egan, Thornton, and Walsh eds., 2014) (explaining that most of the relevant cases under Article 2
are “within the field of access to medical treatment.”).
68 In Öneryildiz v Turkey, several victims died when a methane gas explosion occurred in the garbage
dump where they lived, resulting in an Article 2 violation. Öneryildiz v Turkey, Grand Chamber, App.
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4. The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights
In its 2017 judgment concerning the Ogiek community of Kenya, the
African Court directly considered the right to a “decent” or dignified life.69
The Ogiek population had been evicted from their ancestral lands in the Mau
Forest, and the Court found that Kenya had violated, among others, their
collective rights to property and to “economic, social and cultural
development.”70 The community members also argued that their right to life
had been infringed, as they were “exposed to conditions affecting their
decent way of life.”71 The Court responded that “the sole fact of eviction and
deprivation of economic, social and cultural rights may not necessarily result
in the violation of the right to life” under the African Charter.72
In this way, the African Court has appeared to reject a broader
interpretation of the right to life, explaining that the African Charter’s Article
4 “relates to the physical rather than the existential understanding of the right
to life.”73 The African Court certainly could have accepted a wider concept
of the right. As the Ogiek judgment itself recognized, the African Charter
sets out an expansive formulation for the right, linking the right to life to “the
inviolable nature and integrity of the human being.”74 Moreover, in similar

No. 48939/99, Judgement, Eur. Ct. H.R (2004). In view of this judgment, O’Cinneide argues that it would
involve “no great conceptual leap to suggest that state responsibility may be engaged where individuals
are exposed to specific and distinct threats to their life as a result of their destitution . . . , where the nature
and existence of that distinct threat to life should have been known to the authorities” and reasonable
measures could have been taken to prevent the threat. Colm O’Cinneide, A Modest Proposal: Destitution,
State Responsibility and the European Convention on Human Rights, 5 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 583,
583–605 (2008). See also ELIZABETH WICKS, THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS 219
(2010) (“While [Öneryildiz v Turkey] falls short of imposing a general obligation on state parties to the
ECHR to protect or guarantee the lives of the poor, it does imply that a specific responsibility may emerge
in particular circumstances to protect the destitute from perceptible threats to their lives.”).
69 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Republic of Kenya, Judgement, 006/2012,
Afr.
Comm’n
H.P.R.,
¶
153
(May
26,
2017),
http://en.africancourt.org/images/Cases/Judgment/Application%20006-2012%20%20African%20Commission%20on%20Human%20and%20Peoples%E2%80%99%20Rights%20v.%2
0the%20Republic%20of%20Kenya..pdf.
70 Id. ¶ 210.
71 Id. ¶ 147.
72 Id. ¶ 153. See also Ricarda Roesch, The Ogiek Case of the African Court on Human and Peoples’
Rights: Not So Much News After All?, EJIL: TALK! (June 16, 2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-ogiekcase-of-the-african-court-on-human-and-peoples-rights-not-so-much-news-after-all/ (“The Ogiek case
shows that the causality between the eviction of a group and a violation of their right to life can be difficult
to establish.”).
73 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Republic of Kenya, 006/2012, Afr.
Comm’n H.P.R., ¶ 154.
74 Id. ¶ 152 (“Contrary to other human rights instruments, the Charter establishes the link between
the right to life and the inviolable nature and integrity of the human being. The Court finds that this
formulation reflects the indispensable correlation between these two rights.”).
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circumstances, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has
cited the Inter-American Court’s “right to a dignified life” with approval.75
5. Section Synthesis
To some extent, then, the Human Rights Committee has adopted the
Inter-American Court’s concept of the right to a dignified life.76 Of course, it
remains to be seen how the Committee further refines and applies this
interpretation to the ICCPR States Parties.77 Particularly interesting will be
how the Committee determines precise obligations and entitlements under
the right to life through the individual communications procedure.78
In contrast, the African Court seems to have disapproved of this broader
right to life. However, endorsing this principle was less necessary for social
rights protection in the African regional system, as the African Charter
already establishes several social, economic, and cultural rights—of both
individual and collective nature. For its part, the European Court has also
shown much caution in integrating social rights into the right to life.
Nevertheless, there are promising signs that the Court increasingly
75

See, e.g., Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group
International (on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council) v. Kenya, Comm. No. 276/2003, Afr. Comm’n
H.P.R., ¶ 217, (Feb. 4, 2010) (“The IActHR held that one of the obligations that the State must inescapably
undertake as guarantor to protect and ensure the right to life is that of generating minimum living
conditions that are compatible with the dignity of the human person . . . . In this regard, the State has the
duty to take positive, concrete measures geared towards fulfilment of the right to a decent life, especially
in the case of persons who are vulnerable and at risk, whose care becomes a high priority.”),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/2010_africa_commission_ruling_0.pdf; General
Comment No.3 on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the right to life (Article 4), Afr.
Comm’n H.P.R., ¶ 3 (Nov. 2015) (“[T]he Charter envisages the protection not only of life in a narrow
sense, but of dignified life. This requires a broad interpretation of States’ responsibilities to protect
life . . . .”).
76 As closely reviewed below, to date the Inter-American Court has indicated that water, nutrition,
healthcare, housing, education, and ancestral lands all form part of a dignified life.
77 As noted earlier, the Human Rights Committee’s work was previously criticized because “the
focus of periodic reviews and communications related to article 6 [was] on state action that interferes
with the right to life rather than state inaction in the face of systemic deprivations of the right.” ESCRNet, Recognizing the Interdependence and Indivisibility of the Right to Life with ESC Rights: Written
Submissions for the General Discussion on the Preparation for a General Comment on Article 6 (Right
to
Life)
(June
12,
2015),
https://www.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/WopiFrame.aspx?sourcedoc=/Documents/HRBodies/CCPR/Discuss
ion/2015/ESCR_Net_SRAC_GI.doc&action=default&DefaultItemOpen=1.
78 It is important to point out that language was ultimately removed from the draft General Comment
that may have restricted individual petitions before the Human Rights Committee (or national courts
interpreting the provision). The deleted text provided: “Individuals claiming to be victims of a violation
of the Covenant [for the purposes of article 1 of Optional Protocols] must show, however, that their rights
were directly violated by acts or omissions attributable to the States [P]arties [to the Optional Protocol],
or are under are under a real and personalized risk of being violated.” A11 Initiative for Economic and
Social Rights, Advocating for the Amendment of Paragraph 15 of the Human Rights Committee Draft
General Comment 36, http://www.a11initiative.org/en/advocating-for-the-amendment-of-paragraph-15of-the-human-rights-committee-draft-general-comment-36/ (last visited Nov 20, 2019).
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recognizes the interdependent relationship between social and civil rights.79
While rare with the right to life, the European Court has more frequently
protected socio-economic norms under the rights to humane treatment and
private life.80
II.

THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT AND SOCIAL RIGHTS
A.

Overview

The Inter-American Court has protected and promoted social,
economic, and cultural rights by distinct means.81 First, the Tribunal has
recognized such rights as essential elements of the American Convention’s
Article 4, right to life.82 Second, it has recently introduced a bold
interpretation of the Convention’s Article 26, “Progressive Development,”
to find independent violations of several social rights.83 Third, the Court has
used Article 21, right to property, to safeguard not only indigenous lands and
resources, but also their cultural identity.84 Fourth, it previously utilized due
79 See Liam Thornton, The European Convention on Human Rights: A Socio-Economic Rights
Charter?, in IRELAND AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: 60 YEARS AND BEYOND,
supra note 67, at 227–56; Luke Clements and Alan Simmons, European Court of Human Rights:
Sympathetic Unease, in SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 37, at 409–27.
80 Violations to the European Convention’s Article 3 (Prohibition of Torture) often occur under
circumstances of serious deprivation, such as unacceptable detention conditions. See HARRIS, O’BOYLE
& WARBRICK, supra note 34, at 261. See also Larioshina v. Russia, App. No. 56869/00, Judgement, Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2002), ¶ 3 (“[T]he Court considers that a complaint about a wholly insufficient amount of
pension and the other social benefits may, in principle, raise an issue under Article 3 of the Convention.”).
In cases involving the destruction of homes and destitute living conditions, the Court has found violations
to Article 8 (Right to Respect for Private and Family Life). See generally Dulas v. Turkey, App. No.
25801/94, Judgement, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001); Moldovan and Others v. Romania, App. Nos. 41138/98 and
64320/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005).
81 See generally JAMES L. CAVALLARO, CLARET VARGAS, CLARA SANDOVAL, BERNARD DUHAIME,
CAROLINE BETTINGER-LÓPEZ, STEPHANIE ERIN BREWER, DIANA GUZMÁN, AND CECILIA NADDEO,
DOCTRINE, PRACTICE AND ADVOCACY IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM (2019); Tara Melish, The InterAmerican Court of Human Rights: Beyond Progressivity, in SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING
TRENDS IN COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 37, at 372–408; Mónica Feria-Tinta,
Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Inter-American System of Protection of
Human Rights: Beyond Traditional Paradigms and Notions, 29 HUMAN RIGHTS Q. 431, 431–459 (2007).
82 See infra Sections B and C; Steven R. Keener & Javier Vasquez, A Life Worth Living: Enforcement
of the Right to Health through the Right to Life in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 40 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 595 (2009); Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Right to a Dignified Life (Vida Digna): The
Integration of Economic and Social Rights with Civil and Political Rights in the Inter-American Human
Rights System, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2008).
83 See infra Section D.
84 See, e.g., Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and Reparations, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 341(2) (June 27, 2012) (finding “the violation of the rights to
consultation, to indigenous communal property, and to cultural identity, in the terms of Article 21 of the
American Convention”); Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and
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process and procedural guarantees to protect the rights to a pension and
social security.85 Finally, the Court has ordered expansive socio-cultural
reparations, including housing, health, agricultural, cultural, and educational
programs.86 This section focuses on the Court’s influential right-to-life
approach, with additional discussion of its new and disputed method of
interpreting Article 26.
B.

The Right to Vida Digna

The Court’s right to vida digna, often translated as the right to a
“dignified existence,” or to a “dignified” or “decent” life, is primarily
grounded in the Convention’s Article 4.87 The Tribunal introduced this right
in 1999, through its pioneering judgment Villagrán Morales v. Guatemala;
it has further refined the right in subsequent decisions.88
Villagrán Morales involved the murder of five teenagers by
Guatemalan national police. At the time, there was a brutal crackdown
against “street children” who were perceived to threaten public safety.89 The
Court held that the “fundamental” right to life also includes the “right that [a
human being] will not be prevented from having access to the conditions that
guarantee a dignified existence.”90 The Court also asserted that States should
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 95 (Nov. 28, 2007) (linking Article 21 to the
many rights associated with an indigenous community’s ability “to freely determine and enjoy [its] own
social, cultural and economic development.”).
85 See Melish, supra note 81, at 398. Furthermore, while the American Convention does not mention
unions expressly—unlike the Protocol of San Salvador, the ICCPR, and the European Convention—the
Court has established the right to form trade unions through the Convention’s Article 16, Freedom of
Association. Huilca Tecse v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 121, ¶ 70 (Mar. 3, 2005).
86 For example, the Court has required restitution and clean-up of ancestral lands, and extensive
community development initiatives, including educational, housing, agricultural and health projects. See,
e.g., Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶¶ 293–95;
Saramaka People v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 201; Plan de Sánchez Massacre v.
Guatemala, Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 116, ¶¶ 106–08 (Nov. 19, 2004)
(mandating broad medical, psychological and vocational programs); Juvenile Reeducation Institute v.
Paraguay, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 112, ¶¶ 318–321 (Sept. 2, 2004); Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 250, ¶ 285 (Sept. 4, 2012) (ordering
an initiative “for the rescue, promotion, dissemination and conservation of the ancestral customs and
practices” of the Maya Achí people).
87 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 4, Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (providing that “[e]very person has the right to have his life
respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”). But see Juvenile Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 112, ¶ 190 (finding a breach of both Article 4 and Article 5).
88 See Villagrán Morales v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63, ¶ 191.
89 Id. ¶ 79.
90 Id. ¶ 144.
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provide “at-risk children” with the “minimum conditions for a dignified
life,” because “every child has the right to harbor a project of life that should
be tended and encouraged by the public authorities” so that both the child
and society may benefit.91
In this way, the Court expanded positive State obligations to protect
life, when the “security and integrity” of youth are under threat.92 Later,
Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia condemned the “climate of violence and
insecurity” endured by children in the aftermath of a savage attack on their
community.93 Threats, homelessness, separation from family, and poverty all
ensued—depriving the youth of the “right to a decent life.”94 As a result, the
Court found that the rights to life of surviving children, as well as two youth
killed in the massacre, were violated.95 For similar reasons, the Court found
that displaced adult survivors also suffered a violation of the “right to a
decent life.”96
Gonzales Lluy v. Ecuador concerned a child, Talía Gonzales Lluy, who
was mistakenly given a transfusion with HIV-infected blood.97 The InterAmerican Commission argued that Talía’s right to a dignified life, among
other rights, had been violated by the State’s failure both to regulate the Red
Cross blood bank and to ensure Talía’s medical treatment once her family
filed a criminal complaint.98 Talía survived the ordeal, and ultimately the
Court found that the State violated her rights to life and to personal integrity,
“owing to the violation of the obligation to monitor and supervise the
provision of health care services.”99 The Court did not specifically find a
breach of Talía’s right to a dignified life, although the judgment recognized

91 Id. ¶ 191. See also Juridical Condition & Human Rights of the Child, Advisory Opinion OC17/2002, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 17, ¶ 137(7) (Aug. 28, 2002) (stressing for children “the [State]
obligation to provide the measures required for life to develop under decent conditions.”).
92 See generally Villagrán Morales v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63, ¶ 24 (Trindade,
A.A.C., concurring).
93 ”Mapiripán Massacre” v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 134, ¶ 162 (Sept. 15, 2005).
94 Id. ¶¶ 161–62.
95 Id. ¶ 163.
96 Id. ¶ 186.
97 See generally Gonzales Lluy v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 298 (Sept. 1, 2015).
98 Id. ¶ 1. The Inter-American Commission, among other responsibilities, refers cases to the Court;
while its role has been reduced since 2009, it must appear in all cases before the Tribunal. See generally
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 57, Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
99 Gonzales Lluy v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 298, ¶ 191.
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that her family was forced to go to great lengths “to ensure Talía’s survival”
and to provide “a decent life for her.”100
Juvenile Reeducation Institute involved thousands of detained
teenagers and young adults who faced appalling living conditions.101 The
Court held that States have the duty to ensure that all incarcerated persons,
both children and adults, can still enjoy a vida digna.102 Detention facilities
must allow for “opportunities for exercise or recreation,” education, and
“prompt and proper medical, dental and psychological care.”103 However, the
detainees in Juvenile Reeducation Institute were overcrowded, lacked
medical attention and educational programs, and endured riots and deadly
fires. Consequently, the Court found Paraguay in breach of both Articles 4
and 5 (right to personal integrity) with respect to all detainees at the facility
over a five-year period—amounting to over three thousand individuals.104
In Chinchilla Sandoval v. Guatemala, the Court also linked the rights
to life and personal integrity when assessing detention conditions.105 María
Inés Chinchilla Sandoval, an adult, suffered from serious health problems;
however, she received inadequate medical attention while incarcerated and
eventually died in prison. The Court affirmed that the rights to life and
personal integrity are “directly and immediately linked” to health care.106
Further, the Court emphasized that detained persons cannot, on their own,
obtain “a series of basic necessities essential for the development of a
dignified life.”107 The State must ensure that detention conditions are

100 Id. ¶ 216, 290 (noting that “the situation of poverty also had an impact on the difficulties to gain
access to the education system” and on the victim’s ability to overcome her “numerous factors of
vulnerability and risk.”).
101 Juvenile Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 112, ¶ 4.
102 For example, the judgment stated “the Court must establish whether the State, in fulfillment of its
role of guarantor, took measures to ensure to all inmates at the Center—adults and children alike—the
right to live with dignity and thus help them build their life plan, even while incarcerated.” Id. ¶ 164. The
Court requires additional protections for detained children. Id. ¶ 176.
103 Id. ¶ 166.
104 The Court found additional Article 4 violations in the cases of individuals who had died in
detention for various reasons attributed to the State; additional Article 5 violations were declared in the
cases of victims who had been injured while in detention for causes attributed to Paraguay. Id. ¶ 190.
105 Chinchilla Sandoval v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 312 (Feb. 29, 2016): See also Advisory Opinion OC-23/17,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 23, ¶ 114 (Nov. 15, 2017) (joining the right to life, in particular vida
digna, with the right to personal integrity); Juvenile Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 112, ¶¶ 170–71.
106 Chinchilla Sandoval v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 312, ¶ 170.
107 Id. ¶ 168. See also Mendoza v. Argentina, Preliminary Objections, Merits, and Reparations,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 260, ¶ 188 (May 14, 2013); Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report
on the Human Rights of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas, OEA/ Ser. L/V/II Doc. 64, ¶ 49
(Dec. 31, 2011), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/pdl/docs/pdf/PPL2011eng.pdf.
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“compatible with personal dignity.”108 Specifically, it must safeguard the
physical and mental health of incarcerated persons, through “regular medical
checkups, and when required, medical treatment that is adequate, timely and,
if applicable, specialized and appropriate to [their] special necessities.”109
The Court ultimately concluded that Guatemala violated Articles 4 and 5
with respect to Ms. Chinchilla Sandoval.
In Yakye Axa Community v. Paraguay, the Court first applied its
concept of vida digna to indigenous populations.110 The Yakye Axa
community suffered twelve years of delays while it attempted to reclaim
traditional lands through administrative procedures. In the meantime, the
community lived in a temporary settlement adjacent to their ancestral
territories; however, they were unable to practice their traditional subsistence
activities.111 The housing, sanitation, and health conditions were gravely
deficient.112
The Court stressed that a State holds the “duty to take positive, concrete
measures geared toward fulfillment of the right to a decent life, especially in
the case of persons who are vulnerable and at risk, whose care becomes a
high priority.”113 Further, it considered elements of a dignified life in this
context:
Special detriment to the right to health, and closely tied to this,
detriment to the right to food and access to clean water, have a major
impact on the right to a decent existence and basic conditions to
exercise other human rights, such as the right to education or the
right to cultural identity.114
In view of the community’s abysmal living conditions and fruitless efforts
by Paraguay to alleviate them, the Court found the State responsible for a
violation of the right to vida digna and Article 4 of the Convention.115
Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community involved another displaced
indigenous community in Paraguay.116 The petitioners, a nomadic people,
108

Chinchilla Sandoval v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 312, ¶ 169.
Id. ¶ 171. Subsequently, the Court offers additional, detailed instructions on medical care. See id.
¶¶ 171–225.
110 Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 2, (June 17, 2005).
111 Id. ¶ 164.
112
Id.
113 Id. ¶ 162.
114 Id. ¶ 167
115 Id. ¶ 176.
116 Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 2, (Aug. 24, 2010). Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay
also concerned an indigenous community that sought to reclaim its lands while suffering harrowing living
conditions. Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
109
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claimed over 40 square miles of the Paraguayan Chaco.117 Under a heading
titled “The Right to a Dignified Existence,” the judgment assessed, in more
detail than usual, the following aspects of the community’s situation: “access
to and quality of water,” “diet,” “health,” and “education.”118
As for water access, the Court noted that the water occasionally
supplied by local authorities was far less than the minimum of 7.5 liters per
day per person required by international standards.119 Regarding nutrition,
local ranches had restricted the community’s farming and hunting. Although
the State delivered shipments of food, the Court found these deliveries to be
too infrequent.120 The judgment took note of evidence demonstrating
alarming levels of malnourishment among community members.121
As for health care, the State sent personnel to provide medical treatment
and medicine on several occasions. Nevertheless, the Court considered the
medical care to be “temporary and transitory.”122 It also observed that
hospitals and clinics were located far away, “basic medications” were not
available on site, and Paraguay needed to implement services that respected
the community’s traditions and customs.123 With respect to education for the
Xákmok Kásek, the Court affirmed that States must “guarantee accessibility
and sustainability to free basic education,” and emphasized the use of
culturally-appropriate methods “in the heart of indigenous communities.”124
The judgment found that the community’s school lacked sufficient
resources, and did not offer appropriate shelter from the elements.125
After its assessment, the Court concluded that Paraguay did not furnish
“the basic services to protect the right to a decent life of a specific group of
individuals in these conditions of special, real and immediate risk.” 126 As a
result, like in Yakye Axa, Article 4 was breached with respect to “all the

Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146., ¶ 208. In Sawhoyamaxa, the Court held the State responsible for
nineteen deaths; however, unaccountably, Sawhoyamaxa did not appear to find a violation of the
community’s right to vida digna.
117 Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 68.
118 Id. ¶¶ 193–213.
119 Id. ¶ 195 (citing documents from the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights and the World Health Organization). Little information was available about the water’s
quality.
120 Id. ¶ 200. Based on the information provided to the Court, it concluded that the State supplied
“approximately 0.29 kg per person per day” of food from 2009 to 2010, but the judgment does not explain
precisely how the Court determined that amount was insufficient. Id.
121 Id. ¶ 201.
122 Id. ¶ 208.
123 Id. ¶¶ 207–08.
124 Id. ¶ 211.
125 Id. ¶ 213.
126 Id. ¶¶ 217.
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members” of the Xákmok Kásek Community.127 Further, the Court found an
additional Article 4 violation for thirteen deaths, which were traced to the
precarious health conditions.128 The State did not adopt the necessary
measures “within its powers, that could reasonably be expected to prevent or
to avoid the risk to the right to life.”129
At the end of 2017, the Court returned to the topic of dignified life with
its Advisory Opinion 23, which analyzed State obligations for protecting the
environment under the American Convention.130 As for the right to vida
digna, the advisory opinion primarily focused on the situation of indigenous
and tribal populations, and how States must adopt positive measures to
ensure their “access to a dignified life—which includes the protection of
their close relationship with the land—and to their life project, in both its
individual and collective dimension.”131 The Court underlined the
importance of “access to, and the quality of, water, food and health” for a
dignified life, explaining that these components are also key for the exercise
of other rights.132 It stressed that the protection of the environment is a
“condition” for a dignified life; in this way, pollution and development
projects can jeopardize vida digna.133
Advisory Opinion 23 was the Court’s last major statement on the right
to a dignified life to date. In some ways, it simply reaffirmed how an
indigenous community’s vida digna depends on a robust relationship with
its ancestral lands and natural resources. Yet there were signs that the Court
may have restricted its concept of dignified life. It appears that Advisory
Opinion 23 placed more of an emphasis on “access” to vida digna134 than

127

Id.
Id. ¶ 234.
129 Id. ¶ 234.
130 The Environment and Human Rights (State Obligations in Relation to the Environment in the
Context of the Protection and Guarantee of the Rights to Life and to Personal Integrity: Interpretation and
Scope of Articles 4(1) and 5(1) in Relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 of the American Convention on Human
Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 23.
131 Id. ¶ 48.
132 Id. ¶ 109.
133 Id. ¶¶ 109, 117. See also Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 309, ¶¶ 172, 181 (Nov. 25, 2015) (“[T]he Court has emphasized
the importance of the protection, conservation and improvement of the environment contained in Article
11 of the [Protocol of San Salvador] as an essential human right related to the right to a dignified life
derived from Article 4 of the Convention in light of the existing international corpus iuris on the special
protection required by members of indigenous communities . . . the State must have adequate mechanisms
to implement these criteria as a means of guaranteeing the right to a dignified life and to cultural identity
to the indigenous and tribal peoples in relation to the protection of the natural resources that are in their
traditional territories.”).
134 Advisory Opinion 23, supra note 105, ¶¶ 48, 109, 114, 117.
128
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before.135 A positive right to a dignified life, as opposed to a mere ability to
access such conditions, places far greater obligations on States. Further,
unlike Xákmok Kásek, there was no allusion to education as a part of vida
digna. Still, the Court did not claim to provide an exhaustive list of vida
digna’s elements, and the opinion was intended to focus on environmental
topics.136
C.

Synthesis of the Vida Digna Approach

As of this writing, the Court has indicated that water, nutrition, health
care, housing, education, and ancestral lands all form part of a dignified
life.137 Most cases discussed above involved indigenous peoples, detainees,
or marginalized children.138 The situations often consisted of brutal State
actions, such as in Villagrán Morales, or glaring omissions, like in Xákmok
Kásek Indigenous Community. Nevertheless, a close textual analysis shows
that those three specific groups are not required to “activate” vida digna
obligations. Also unnecessary is a particularly shocking form of official
action or omission. Rather, with this jurisprudence, the Court has developed
an expansive State duty “to take positive, concrete measures” to protect
individuals or communities who find themselves in “conditions of special,
real and immediate risk” to a broad right to life.139 If the authorities know or
should know that persons are in such a situation, they must take reasonable
135
It is true that Villagran Morales described a “right that [a human being] will not be prevented
from having access to the conditions that guarantee a dignified existence.” Villagrán Morales v.
Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63, ¶ 144. But “access” is mentioned less as the Court’s
jurisprudence develops. See, e.g., Kaliña and Lokono Peoples, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 309, ¶ 172
(affirming an unqualified right to a dignified life); Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 217 (same); Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 134, ¶ 162 (“[T]he State did not create the conditions and did
not take the necessary steps for the boys and girls of the instant case to have and develop a decent life.”).
136 See Advisory Opinion 23, supra note 105, ¶¶ 117, 109 (explaining that the requisites for a
dignified life are water and adequate food, among others).
137 The aspect of housing is less explicitly discussed in the case law, but it finds strong support in
Mapiripán Massacre and Yakye Axa. See Mapiripán Massacre Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 134, ¶¶
161–62 (considering that many families were displaced from their homes and had to build shacks of tin
and plastic, before declaring a vida digna violation); Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 125, ¶¶ 50.94, 164 (finding, as an element of a vida digna violation, that community members
lacked access “to appropriate housing with the basic minimum services.”).
138 Yet in Mapiripán Massacre, as described above, the Court took a somewhat different approach
when it declared a vida digna violation with respect to internally-displaced adults (along with children),
who had not been identified as indigenous peoples in the judgment. Mapiripán Massacre, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 134, ¶¶ 186, 189.
139 Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 162; Xákmok
Kásek Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 217. Similarly,
Yakye Axa asserts that States “must inescapably . . . generat[e] minimum living conditions that are
compatible with the dignity of the human person.” Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 125, ¶ 162.
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measures to protect them, or the State will violate, at a minimum, the right
to vida digna.140
Thus, the State obligations are more extensive than what many assume.
The cases concerned traditionally-vulnerable individuals and communities,
but indicate that States can be held liable for failing to ensure the right to
dignified life of any person. The Court has yet to define its standards for
“special, real and immediate risk.” But it should be noted that the Court does
not require or perform personalized risk assessments in certain group cases,
where it has found violations of the right to vida digna with respect to
hundreds of indigenous community members, or even thousands of youth at
the Paraguayan detention center.141 It is enough to show that the group, as a
whole, faces threats to a dignified life. Further, in addition to the individual
and collective reparations ordered in these judgments, the Court will often
require structural remedies, such as legislative reform, reaching far beyond
the victims of the case.142
However, the vida digna approach may have already reached its high
watermark. In Advisory Opinion 23, the Court noted that only in “exceptional
circumstances” may the right to life be found violated when a victim has not
died.143 Lately, it does seem exceptional that the Court will declare a vida
digna violation, or even devote significant attention to the concept.144 In very
recent cases, even when the Inter-American Commission or victims’
attorneys claim a breach of the right to a dignified life, the Court has avoided
much discussion of the issue.145 The main reason for this shift is explained in
the next section.

140

Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 188 (“In
order for this positive obligation to be applicable, it must be established that at the moment the facts
occurred, the authorities knew or should have known of the existence of a situation of real and immediate
risk to the life of an individual or a particular group of individuals and that the authorities did not take the
measures necessary within the scope of their duties that, reasonably speaking, one could expect to include
preventing or avoiding those risks.”).
141 See Juvenile Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 112, ¶ 176
(“These violations were committed to the detriment of all inmates at the Institute in the period from
August 14, 1996 to July 25, 2001.”).
142 See, e.g., Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214,
¶ 337 (ordering these various measures); Juvenile Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 112, ¶ 340 (ordering all such measures).
143 Advisory Opinion 23, supra note 105, ¶ 109 (translation by author).
144 But see Muelle Flores v. Peru, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 375, ¶¶ 197, 233 (Mar. 6, 2019) (stating that “retirement pensions, and in
general social security, constitute a means of protection to enjoy a dignified life,” and ordering Peru to
provide the victim a pension to secure him the “basic conditions of dignified life”) (translation by author).
145 See, e.g., Cuscul Pivaral v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 359 (Aug. 23, 2018) (discussed in text immediately below);
Duque v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
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D.

Article 26: A New Approach to Social Rights

The Court’s declining emphasis on vida digna is illustrated by the
recent judgment Cuscul Pivaral v. Guatemala.146 In Cuscul Pivaral,
numerous petitioners argued that their right to vida digna was violated
because Guatemala failed to adopt measures to ensure their adequate medical
care. Yet the Court did not consider the links between life, personal integrity,
and health, as it did two years earlier in Chinchilla Sandoval v. Guatemala.147
Rather, the judgment held that because the facts constituted a violation of the
right to health under the American Convention’s Article 26, it was
unnecessary to examine the right to life.148
The American Convention does not expressly establish the right to
health.149 Beyond the Convention’s Preamble, its Article 26 contains the
main reference to social, economic, and cultural rights:
The States Parties undertake to adopt measures, both internally and
through international cooperation, especially those of an economic
and technical nature, with a view to achieving progressively, by
legislation or other appropriate means, the full realization of the
rights implicit in the economic, social, educational, scientific, and
cultural standards set forth in the Charter of the Organization of
American States as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires.150
In 2017, the Court—for the very first time—found a violation of Article 26
in Lagos del Campo v. Peru.151 Since then, it has declared Article 26
violations in five more judgments, including Cuscul Pivaral, rapidly creating
an entirely new line of jurisprudence on social rights.152

H.R. (ser. C) No. 310 (Feb. 26, 2016); Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 245.
146 Cuscul Pivaral v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 359.
147 Chinchilla Sandoval v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 312.
148 Id. ¶ 160.
149 American Convention, supra note 36.
150 Id. art. 26.
151 Lagos del Campo v. Peru, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 340 (Aug. 31, 2017).
152 See Muelle Flores v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 375 (violation of the right to social
security); Cuscul Pivaral v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 359 (violation of the right to
health); Poblete Vilches v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 349 (Mar. 8, 2018) (violations of the rights to health and to “obtain informed consent and access to
information as relates to health”) (translation by author); San Miguel Sosa v. Venezuela, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 348 (Feb. 8, 2018) (violation of the
right to work); Dismissed Employees of Petroperú v. Peru, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 344 (Nov. 23, 2017) (violation of the right to work);
Lagos del Campo v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 340 (violation of the right to “job stability”)
(translation by author).
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In these recent decisions, the Court variously held that the rights to
social security, health,153 work, and “job stability” are all protected by Article
26; in Advisory Opinion 23, it stated that the Article also safeguarded the
right to “a healthy environment.”154 The Court made these determinations by
concluding that the rights are “implicit” in the Organization of American
States (OAS) Charter’s “economic, social, educational, scientific, and
cultural standards.”155 For many years, the Court has considered that the
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man “contains and
defines” the rights of the OAS Charter.156 Consequently, it also has taken the
Declaration’s provisions into account when deciding whether these social
rights are protected by the Charter, and thus, by Article 26.157
This pivotal, and surprising, development has attracted its share of
controversy, and a few current judges continue to object to the approach.
Some of the primary objections are outlined in this section, although a full
discussion of the debate falls out of this Article’s scope. A first objection
involves the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human
Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, also known as
the “Protocol of San Salvador.”158 Sixteen States have ratified or acceded to
the Protocol of San Salvador, which entered into force in November of
1999.159
The Protocol establishes the right to work, “just, equitable, and
satisfactory conditions of work,” trade union rights, right to social security,
right to health, right to “a healthy environment,” right to food, right to
education, right to “the benefits of culture,” right to “the formation and the
153 Poblete Vilches also established the right to “obtain informed consent and access to information
as relates to health.” Poblete Vilches v. Chile, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 349, ¶ 267(5) (translation
by author).
154 Advisory Opinion 23, supra note 105, ¶ 57. See also Maria L. Banda, Inter-American Court of
Human Rights’ Advisory Opinion on the Environment and Human Rights, ASIL INSIGHTS Vol. 22, Issue
6 (May 10, 2018) (“The recognition of an independent right to a healthy environment (justiciable under
Article 26) could open the door to new categories of claims in the Inter-American system”).
155 American Convention, supra note 36, art. 26.
156 Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man within the Framework
of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, 1989 InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 10, ¶ 43 (July 14, 1989).
157 However, note that the American Declaration does not mention all of these rights. Also, the Court
purports to use other methods of interpretation as well, such as considering Article 29 of the American
Convention and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
158 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (“Protocol of San Salvador”), O.A.S.T.S. No. 69, 28 I.L.M. 156 (Nov. 16,
1999).
159 A:52: Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights “Protocol of San Salvador” General Information of the Treaty,
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-52.html [hereinafter Protocol of San Salvador] (last visited
Oct. 27, 2019).
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protection of families,” rights of children, and protections for the elderly and
disabled.160 However, the treaty grants jurisdiction to the Inter-American
Commission and Court only over petitions that allege violations of Articles
8 and/or 13, which protect the rights to unions and education, respectively.161
Thus, critics of the Court’s new Article 26 approach argue that the States of
the region created a specialized treaty for social rights that should not be
disregarded—and in particular, this regional consensus provides the Court
only very limited jurisdiction over these rights.162
Second, Article 26’s “progressive” obligations caused the Court to
hesitate for years on the question of justiciability. Could individual petitions
prove a violation of such obligations, and thus be adjudicated by the Court?
It took two decades for the Tribunal to acknowledge only that a State’s
“progressive implementation” or regression with respect to social rights
“may be subjected to accountability” under Article 26—without explaining
how.163 With recent changes to the Court’s roster of judges, however, this
issue suddenly became much less of an obstacle.164
A third concern, among others, involves the broad language of Article
26. If the Court adjudicates the provision in individual cases, this grants it
wide discretion to define rights “implicit in” the OAS Charter’s “economic,
social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards.”165 In fact, a review of
these numerous Charter “standards”—which in many instances refer to
amorphous principles and objectives of public policy—confirms that the
Court’s discretion has become expansive indeed.166
160

Id. arts. 6–18.
Id. art. 19(6).
162 See, e.g., Lagos del Campo v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 340 (partially dissenting
opinion of Judge Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto); Oswaldo Ruíz-Chiriboga, The American Convention
and the Protocol of San Salvador: Two Intertwined Treaties, 31 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 159, 185–186
(2013) (criticizing the Court for paying insufficient attention to the Protocol).
163 Acevedo Buendía (“Discharged and Retired Employees of the Comptroller”) v. Peru, Preliminary
Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 198 ¶¶ 102–03
(July 1, 2009).
164 See Caso Poblete Vilches v. Chile, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 349 ¶ 104 (interpreting
“immediate” state obligations in Article 26) (translation by author).
165 See Christian Courtis, El Artículo 26, in LA CONVENCIÓN AMERICANA COMENTADA (2014) (in
which Christian Courtis considers that the following Articles of the OAS Charter lead to social, economic
and cultural rights: Articles 2, 3, 30, 31, 34, 39, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, and 52. Courtis has argued that, at
a minimum, these rights include various cultural and consumer rights, as well as rights to education, work,
social security, housing, food, and health).
166 Charter of the Organization of American States art. 34, Apr. 30, 1948, 119 U.N.T.S. 3. (providing
for: equality of opportunity; equitable distribution of wealth and income; increase of per capita national
product; adequate and equitable systems of taxation; reforms leading to equitable and efficient land-tenure
systems, increased agricultural productivity, expanded use of land, diversification of production and
improved processing and marketing systems for agricultural products; accelerated and diversified
industrialization; stability of domestic price levels; fair wages, employment opportunities, and acceptable
161
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In this way, despite the typical objections sketched here, the Court has
introduced a second novel approach to social rights, after vida digna. In only
two years, it has already shown enthusiasm for identifying these rights under
Article 26 and finding States responsible for violations. The latest judgments,
such as Cuscul, suggest that the Tribunal’s current majority prefers to assess
social rights independently, rather than link them to the right to life under a
vida digna approach.
III.
ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT TO A DIGNIFIED LIFE:
SUPRAPOSITIVE, CONSENSUAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS
A.

Overview

This section will assess the Inter-American Court’s vida digna
approach through Gerald Neuman’s useful analytical framework. According
to Neuman, human rights have suprapositive, consensual, and institutional
aspects.167 Rights interpretation “draws on all three of these aspects in a
manner that makes the convention system justifiable, politically acceptable,
and effective.”168 To begin, suprapositive norms consist in “principles that
have normative force independent of their embodiment in law, or even
superior to the positive legal system.”169 These principles emanate from
natural law, religion, ethics, and cultural values, among others; human rights
treaty provisions often attempt to reflect these “preexisting” norms.170
The consensual aspect in international law, of course, refers to the
agreement of States. Their consensual actions include not only the creation
and ratification of treaties, but also subsequent acts “of express or implicit
consensual revision.”171 Finally, the institutional element considers realities
and limitations encountered when interpreting a right in a certain way. The
institutional aspect does not necessarily provide a “third source of

working conditions for all; rapid eradication of illiteracy and expansion of educational opportunities for
all; extension and application of modern medical science; proper nutrition; adequate housing; urban
conditions that offer the opportunity for a healthful, productive, and full life; promotion of private
initiative and investment in harmony with action in the public sector; and expansion and diversification
of exports—all of which are referred to as “goals”).
167 Gerald L. Neuman, Import, Export, and Regional Consent in the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 101, 111 (2008) [hereinafter Neuman 1]; Gerald L. Neuman, Human Rights
and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and Dissonance, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1863, 1866 (2003) [hereinafter
Neuman 2]. See also Katharine G. Young, The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept
in Search of Content, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 113, 126–158 (2008) (discussing the “essence,” “consensus,”
and “obligations” approaches).
168 Young, supra note 167, at 123.
169 See Neuman 2, supra note 167, at 1868.
170 Id.
171 Neuman 1, supra note 167, at 111.
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legitimation” for rights, but rather may represent “practical constraints” on
rights, which already derive their legitimacy from suprapositive or
consensual sources.172 In a specific situation, the three elements can converge
or diverge. For example, a particular interpretation of a right could reflect a
suprapositive norm convincingly; however, from an institutional perspective
the interpretation may pose significant complexities for enforcement.173
B.

Suprapositive Aspect

The Inter-American Court has called for States to safeguard the right to
a dignified life. Beyond the Court and the Human Rights Committee, several
domestic courts and international human rights authorities have joined
dignity to the right to life. In 1981, the Supreme Court of India famously
held:
The right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all
that goes along with it, namely, the bare necessaries of life such as
adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for reading,
writing and expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving about
and mixing and commingling with fellow human beings.174
Judges, human rights experts, and many others have drawn the intuitive
conclusion that insufficient levels of food, shelter, health care, and other
needs both imperil survival and deprive human existence of dignity.175 In
these circumstances, the right to life is emptied of its substance.
Clearly, the right to vida digna appeals directly to human dignity as its
suprapositive principle. Human dignity has served as the foundation for the
international human rights movement, the American and Universal
Declarations of Human Rights, and the numerous instruments that
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See Neuman 2, supra note 167, at 1869.
Id. at 1872.
174 Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, AIR 1981 SC 746 (India).
175 See, e.g., Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, supra note 51, ¶ 27 (“The right
to life cannot be separated from the right to a secure place to live, and the right to a secure place to live
only has meaning in the context of a right to live in dignity and security, free of violence”); FARMER,
supra note 29, at 16–17 (explaining how “the absence of social and economic power empties [other]
rights of their substance”); Ibrahim Sangor Osman and Others v. the Hon. Minister of State for Provincial
Administration and Internal Security and Others (2011) K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya) (“[P]eople living
without the basic necessities of life are deprived of human dignity, freedom and equality”); Government
of the Republic of South Africa and Others v. Grootboom and Others, 2000 (10) BCLR 84 (CC) ¶ 44 (S.
Afr.) (“A society must seek to ensure that the basic necessities of life are provided to all if it is to be a
society based on human dignity, freedom and equality.”); JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS:
COLLECTED PAPERS 1981–1991 3 (1993) (“[N]o society can pride itself on respect for the individual if
its social and economic structures have the effect of excluding large numbers of people from access to . . .
necessities of material life.”).
173
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followed.176 “The dignity and worth of the human person”177 encompasses
several religious and philosophical traditions, which has led to the principle’s
repeated affirmation in the halls of the United Nations and at constitutional
conventions across the globe.178
As it is embraced by diverse communities, there are also a number of
ways to explain and define human dignity.179 The concept, without more,
does not precisely set the boundaries of the right to life, nor does it specify
exactly which social, economic, and cultural norms inhere to the right.180
Dignity could arguably lead to requirements for a prosperous life, or merely
to demand survival conditions. In most cases, when courts apply human
dignity to the right to life, they expand the right’s content, perhaps to better
reflect the suprapositive nature of dignity. Judges have also enlisted human
dignity to extend other rights or even to create new ones.181
Below, the section on institutional aspects will consider consequences
for the right to life when judges and others interpret it in light of human
dignity. For now, it is sufficient to identify the suprapositive principle that
forms the basis for the right to vida digna. While varying in meaning, human
dignity stands as one of the most accepted and powerful principles in law,
philosophy, and religion.182
176 See Organization of American States, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,
O.A.S. G.A. Res. XXX, Preamble, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L.V./II.82 doc.6 rev.1 (1948) (“All men are
born free and equal, in dignity and in rights, and, being endowed by nature with reason and conscience,
they should conduct themselves as brothers one to another.”); G.A. Res 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, at 72 (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter
reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in
the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards
of life in larger freedom.”). See also Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J.
(C326) 396 (“Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected.”).
177 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
178 See UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY (Christopher McCrudden ed., 2013) (several chapters
exploring historical, theological, philosophical, and judicial aspects of human dignity); Christopher
McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655, 656–
663 (2008).
179 See McCrudden, supra note 178, at 655.
180 In international human rights law, human dignity often serves as a foundational norm (appearing
in the Preambles of the ICCPR and the ICESCR, for example), but occasionally appears in operational
provisions as well. See Gerald L. Neuman, Discourses of Dignity, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY,
supra note 178, at 643. To illustrate, in the articles of the American Convention, dignity is referenced
with respect to the treatment of detained persons, forced labor, and the rights to privacy and honor. See
American Convention, supra note 36, arts. 5, 6, and 11.
181 See McCrudden, supra note 178, at 721. Paolo Carozza suggests caution before expanding rights
with human dignity, as the result may not reflect “shared experience.” Paolo Carozza, Human Rights,
Human Dignity, and Human Experience, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 178, at 629.
182 See Christopher McCrudden, In Pursuit of Human Dignity: An Introduction to Current Debates,
in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 178, at 1 (“[H]uman dignity has probably never
been . . . so deeply embedded in political and legal discourse . . . . The power of the concept of human
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C.

Consensual Aspect

This section assesses to what extent States Parties to the American
Convention on Human Rights may have consented to the right to a dignified
life. To do so, it first considers the Convention’s text, context, and
negotiating history. Then, the analysis examines additional relevant
instruments in the Inter-American System, as well as State constitutional law
and practice—in particular State responses to the Inter-American Court’s
judgments on vida digna.
The American Convention’s Article 4(1) establishes: “Every person has
the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and,
in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his life.”183 The rest of the Article’s paragraphs address the death
penalty.184 The American Convention’s formulation of the right to life mainly
drew from the ICCPR’s life provision, with only a few exceptions.185 Neither
the official negotiation record on Article 4, nor the provision itself expressly
refers to a broader right to a dignified life.186
The authoritative Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides
familiar rules of interpretation for treaties.187 The ordinary meaning of Article
4 may not indicate a concept of vida digna; however, the context and purpose
of the treaty should also be considered.188 In this way, the Convention’s other

dignity is unquestionable.”); ERIN DALY, DIGNITY RIGHTS: COURTS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE WORTH
OF THE HUMAN PERSON (2013) (discussing how courts around the world interpret dignity); Paolo G.
Carozza, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights: A Reply, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 931,
935 (2008) (affirming dignity’s capacity to “challenge and undermine the legitimacy of a wide array of
political and economic systems which . . . have wielded power in ways systematically contrary to the
good of human persons.”); Young, supra note 167, at 133 (Human dignity is “a value that arguably
represents the reigning ideology of both human rights and liberal constitutionalism.”).
183 The American Convention is the only human rights treaty that expressly determines the point
from which the right to life must be safeguarded. ANTKOWIAK & GONZA, supra note 34, at 57. The
European Convention establishes a list of possible limitations to life, while the American Convention, the
ICCPR, and the African Charter take a more flexible approach, prohibiting “arbitrary” deprivations of
life. Id. at 58.
184 See American Convention, supra note 36, art. 4, ¶ 2–6 (referring to capital punishment).
185 As noted, the American Convention specifies the point from which the right to life must be
protected; in addition, during the treaty’s negotiation, State delegates increased limitations on capital
punishment. See ANTKOWIAK & GONZA, supra note 34, at 59–60.
186 Near the end of the conference that adopted the American Convention, however, the United States
and Brazilian delegations issued a vague resolution that stated, “The United States and Brazil interpret
the language of paragraph 1 of Article 4 as preserving to State Parties discretion with respect to the content
of legislation in the light of their own social development, experience and similar factors.” Minutes of the
Second
Plenary
Session,
Doc.
86,
441,
(Nov.
22,
1969),
available
at
https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/mandato/Basicos/actas-conferencia-interamericana-Derechos-Humanos1969.pdf.
187 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31–33, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
188 Id. art. 31.
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terms and Preamble should be examined, as well as subsequent agreements
and practice by States Parties, among other aspects.189
As noted above, the Convention’s Article 26 provides that States must
“undertake to adopt measures” toward the “full realization of the rights
implicit” in the provisions of the OAS Charter.190 The OAS Charter’s Article
34 actually mentions vida digna—although it is translated as “full life”—
where it sets out developmental goals for States, including “[u]rban
conditions that offer the opportunity for a healthful, productive, and full
life.”191 The American Convention’s Preamble also supports dignified living
conditions by declaring “the ideal of free men enjoying freedom from fear
and want can be achieved only if conditions are created whereby everyone
may enjoy his economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as his civil and
political rights.”192
The San Salvador Protocol to the American Convention, as discussed
previously, sets out a range of social rights, but has not been fully ratified in
the region. The Protocol makes two references to vida digna and two to
“dignified subsistence,” in the context of the rights to work, social security,
and education.193 The instrument does not directly establish dignified life as
a right, but rather as an objective to be attained through these other rights.
The recent Inter-American Convention on Protecting the Human Rights of
Older Persons, which entered into force in 2017 and has been ratified by
seven nations, similarly refers to vida digna in relation to the right to social
security.194

189

Id. arts. 31–33.
American Convention, supra note 36, art. 26.
191 Charter of the Organization of American States art. 34, Apr. 30, 1948, 119 U.N.T.S. 3. The InterAmerican Commission’s original draft proposal for the American Convention contained the standards
currently found in the OAS Charter’s Article 34; this text was eventually removed in the final version of
the Convention’s Article 26. See Thomas Antkowiak, Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights: The InterAmerican Court at a Crossroads, in THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THEORY AND
PRACTICE, PRESENT AND FUTURE 260–61 (Yves Haeck, Oswaldo Ruiz-Chiriboga & Clara Burbano
Herrera eds., 2015). See also id. art. 45(a) (“All human beings, without distinction as to race, sex,
nationality, creed, or social condition, have a right to material well-being and to their spiritual
development, under circumstances of liberty, dignity, equality of opportunity, and economic security.”).
192 American Convention, supra note 36, Preamble (referring to “the Third Special Inter-American
Conference [that] approved the incorporation into the Charter of the Organization itself of broader
standards with respect to economic, social, and educational rights and resolved that an inter-American
convention on human rights should determine the structure, competence, and procedure of the organs
responsible for these matters.”).
193 Protocol of San Salvador, supra note 159, arts. 6–7, 9, 13.
194 Inter-American Convention on Protecting the Human Rights of Older Persons art. 17, June 15,
2015, 55 I.L.M. 985. Among other rights, this Convention also establishes that “[o]lder persons have the
right to decent and adequate housing and to live in safe, healthy, and accessible environments that can be
adapted to their preferences and needs.” Id. art. 24.
190
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In addition to the regional treaties, the American Declaration on the
Rights and Duties of Man, which preceded the American Convention,
certainly merits discussion. While formally non-binding, the Declaration
stands as a very influential instrument for the Americas.195 The Declaration’s
Article XI, titled “Right to the preservation of health and to well-being,”
provides:
Every person has the right to the preservation of his health through
sanitary and social measures relating to food, clothing, housing and
medical care, to the extent permitted by public and community
resources.196
Other Declaration articles recognizing the rights to education, work, and
property seek to “attain a decent life,” a “suitable standard of living,” and the
“essential needs of decent living,” respectively.197 Finally, the Social Charter
of the Americas, adopted in 2012, declares in its first article that OAS
Member States must promote development “with a view to eliminating
poverty, especially extreme poverty, and achieving a decent standard of
living for all.”198
Of course, human rights treaties are special international agreements,
which attempt to protect individuals and groups, rather than to benefit States
Parties directly. Both the Inter-American and European human rights
systems have affirmed that their conventions are “living instruments,” whose
interpretation “must consider changes over time and present-day
conditions.”199 Thus, both the Inter-American and European Courts have
engaged in “evolutive interpretation”200 to ensure that treaty rights stay both
“contemporary and effective.”201 Over the years, the European Court in
195 See Douglass Cassel, Inter-American Human Rights Law, Soft and Hard, in COMMITMENT AND
COMPLIANCE, THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 393–94
(Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion
OC-10/89, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 10, ¶¶ 42–43 (July 14, 1989). As noted earlier, the Declaration
also influences the interpretation of rights in the OAS Charter.
196 Organization of American States, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S.
G.A. Res. XXX, art. XI, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L.V./II.82 doc.6 rev.1 (1948).
197 Id. arts. XII, XIV, XXIII, respectively.
198 Social Charter of the Americas art. 1, Sept. 20, 2012, AG/doc.5242/12 rev. 2. In 2015, OAS
Member States approved a Plan of Action for the Social Charter. OAS Adopts Plan of Action of the Social
Charter of the Americas, SEDINEWS, http://www.oas.org/en/sedi/nl/0215/1_en.asp (last visited Dec. 23,
2019).
199 Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due
Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 16, ¶ 114 (Oct. 1, 1999);
Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 183 (1978).
200 Id.
201 Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and the Evolutive Interpretation of the European
Convention on Human Rights, 12 GERMAN L.J. 10, 1730, 1730 (2011) (“An evolutive interpretation of
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particular has paid close attention to evolving consensus among States
Parties—as expressed through national law and practice, as well as standards
issued by the Council of Europe—before extending and redefining
Convention rights.202
Having examined relevant Inter-American human rights instruments,
national constitutional law should now be considered for a possible
consensus on vida digna. For many decades, the nations of Central and South
America have recognized human dignity in their constitutions.203 In these
texts, dignity often features as one of the central national values and as a
basis for fundamental rights. Since 1988, Latin America has experienced a
wave of constitutional creation and reform.204 This period of renewal has led
to the greater incorporation of economic, social, and cultural rights, as well
as stronger connections of domestic legal systems to international human
rights law—including the case law of the Inter-American Court.205

the ECHR is the tool that keeps the meaning of the rights both contemporary and effective.”). Citing this
“evolution of the fundamental rights of the human person in contemporary international law” and the
American Convention’s savings clause (Article 29), the Inter-American Court frequently refers to other
international instruments in order to develop the content of the Convention’s rights. See, e.g., Chitay Nech
v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 212, ¶ 165 (May 25, 2010) (using the Convention on the Rights of the Child to define contours of
the American Convention’s Article 19, Rights of the Child); Saramaka People v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 92 (referring to the ILO Convention No. 169 to assess indigenous rights to
property).
202 See Dzehtsiarou, supra note 201, at 1731 (quoting Tyrer, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 183);
Neuman 1, supra note 167, at 102, 107 (also noting that, with respect to importing international principles
and case law, “the [Inter-American] Court has come to undervalue the consent of the relevant community
of states as a factor in the interpretation of a human rights treaty.”). More recently, the Inter-American
Court has taken a greater interest in regional standards and national law. See, e.g., ANTKOWIAK & GONZA,
supra note 34, at 2, 161–62 (observing greater deference to States and domestic law in the Court’s newer
judgments); Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶¶
159–64 (surveying national laws in the Americas on “the right to consultation of indigenous and tribal
communities.”).
203 See McCrudden, supra note 178, at 664. Thirty Constitutions in the Americas currently refer to
“human dignity” or “dignity,” https://www.constituteproject.org (follow “Explore Constitutions”
hyperlink; then search for “dignity”; then filter by country and select “Americas, Entire Region”).
204 Rodrigo Uprimny, The Recent Transformation of Constitutional Law in Latin America: Trends
and Challenges, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1587, 1587 (2011).
205 See id. at 1589–94; Sergio García Ramírez, The Relationship between Inter-American
Jurisdiction and States (National Systems): Some Pertinent Questions, 5 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L COMP. L.
115, 128 (2015) (“Recent decades have seen important constitutional reforms in various American
nations, with . . . a single goal—the primacy of human rights—and an alliance, for this purpose, between
international treaties and domestic norms.”); Carlos E. Gallegos Anda, Good Living and Vida Digna:
Latin
American
Approaches
to
Social
and
Economic
Inequality
9,
https://www.academia.edu/32427106/Good_Living_and_Vida_Digna_Latin_American_Approaches_to
_Social_and_Economic_Inequality.
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As for vida digna specifically, the constitutions of Bolivia, Ecuador,
and Venezuela all expressly refer to this term.206 Ecuador directly establishes
a right to vida digna, which “assures” health, nutrition, housing, potable
water, and “other necessary social services.”207 Several other constitutions of
the region use comparable phrases: “dignified existence,” “decent
existence,” or the “good life.”208 While these concepts are usually not framed
as rights, various texts establish, as a major national objective, that poverty
or inequality should be addressed to achieve a “dignified existence” for all.209
An even greater number of constitutions require employment rights and
benefits in order to ensure “dignified” living conditions.210 Further,
206 In the Constitutions of Bolivia and Venezuela, the term vida digna is used where demanding
employment rights and benefits that will ensure a dignified life. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO
Feb. 7, 2009, art. 70 (Bol.); CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA Dec. 20,
1999, art. 100. The San Salvador Protocol to the American Convention takes a similar approach. See
Protocol of San Salvador, supra note 159, arts. 6, 9.
207 CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DEL ECUADOR Sept. 28, 2008, art. 66(2) (“El derecho a una
vida digna, que asegure la salud, alimentación y nutrición, agua potable, vivienda, saneamiento ambiental,
educación, trabajo, empleo, descanso y ocio, cultura física, vestido, seguridad social y otros servicios
sociales necesarios.”).
208 See, e.g., CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] Oct. 5, 1988, art. 170 (Braz.) (“The
economic order” is “intended to assure everyone a dignified existence.”); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE
LA REPÚBLICA DE PANAMÁ, 1972, art. 64 (State is obliged to “ensure to every workman the necessary
conditions for a decent existence.”); Constitución Política del Estado Feb. 7, 2009, art. 8 (Bol.) (“The
State adopts and promotes” principles such as “teko kavi (good life) . . . .”).
209 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] Oct. 5, 1988, arts. 3, 170 (Braz.) (“Fundamental
objective” of the State is “to eradicate poverty” and substandard living conditions . . . . “The economic
order, founded on the appreciation of the value of human labor and free enterprise, is intended to assure
everyone a dignified existence.”); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] Jul. 4, 1991, arts. 2, 334
(explaining that an “essential” purpose is to promote “general prosperity” and the “improvement of the
quality of life of the inhabitants.”); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE NICARAGUA [CN.] tit.
VI, ch. I, art. 98, LA GACETA, DIARIO OFICIAL [L.G.] Jan. 9, 1987, as amended by Ley No. 854, Ley de
Reforma Parcial a la Constitución Política de la República de Nicaragua, L.G. Feb. 10, 2014 (“The
principal function of the State in the economy is to achieve the sustainable human development in the
country; to improve the living conditions of the people and to realize a more just distribution of wealth in
the pursuit of a good life.”); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Feb. 7, 2009, Preamble (Bol.) (“A
State based on respect and equality for all, on principles of sovereignty, dignity, interdependence,
solidarity, harmony, and equity in the distribution and redistribution of the social wealth, where the search
for a good life predominates.”); CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DEL ECUADOR Sept. 28, 2008,
Preamble (“Decidimos construir una nueva forma de convivencia ciudadana, en diversidad y armonía con
la naturaleza, para alcanzar el buen vivir, el sumak kawsay.”).
210 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA Nov. 7, 1949, art. 57 (referencing a
“dignified existence” in this context); CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA Feb. 24, 2019, art. 31
(“Paid labor must be the principal source of income that sustains dignified living conditions.”);
CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE EL SALVADOR Dec. 20, 1983, art. 37 (“State shall employ all
resources that are in its reach to provide employment . . . and to ensure . . . the economic conditions for a
dignified existence.”); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE GUATEMALA, May 31, 1985, art.
102(a) (“The right to the free choice of work and the satisfactory economic conditions that guarantee a
dignified existence for the worker and his [or her] family.”); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA
DE NICARAGUA [CN.] tit. IV, ch. V, art. 82, LA GACETA, DIARIO OFICIAL [L.G.] Jan. 9, 1987, as amended
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constitutional and high courts in Latin America have strengthened the links
between life, dignity, and living conditions.211
Also relevant in assessing regional consent is a review of how States
have responded to the Inter-American Court’s case law on vida digna.
Especially over the last decade, the Inter-American Court and the InterAmerican Commission have faced resistance by States due to various legal
and institutional issues.212 Yet it appears that the Court’s right to vida digna
has not directly caused conflict or backlash.
When debated before the Court,213 defendant States at times have not
explicitly addressed the right to a dignified life.214 On other occasions, States
have recognized the importance of dignified living conditions or the right to

by Ley No. 854, Ley de Reforma Parcial a la Constitución Política de la República de Nicaragua, L.G.
Feb. 10, 2014 (“Equal pay for equal work under identical conditions . . . which ensure well-being
compatible with human dignity”); CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL DE LA REPÚBLICA DEL PARAGUAY Jun. 20,
1992, art. 92 (“[W]orkers have the right to enjoy a remuneration that assures . . . a free and dignified
life.”). See also CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE PANAMÁ 1972, arts. 64, 122 (setting out
a stronger formulation of the right of workers and farmers to a “decent existence”).
211 See, e.g., Corte Constitucional [C.C] [Constitutional Court], enero 22, 2004, Sentencia T-025,
(¶ 6.3.2) (Colom.) (stating that the right to vida digna, among others, of the case’s displaced communities
is under threat because of their difficult living conditions); Corte Constitucional [C.C] [Constitutional
Court] mayo 10, 2010, Sentencia 0108/2010-R, numero de archivo 2006-14391-29-RAC (Bol.) (finding
that the rights to life and health were violated when HIV medication was not consistently provided to a
child); Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CS]N] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 01/06/2000,
“Association Benghalensis,” A. 186. XXXIV (Arg.) (holding that the State is obligated to care for HIV
patients, under the premise that the right to life includes the right to health); Flavia Piovesan, Brazil:
Impact and Challenges of Social Rights in the Courts, in SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING
TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMFPARATIVE LAW, supra note 37, at 182, 185 (describing several
rulings from the Brazilian Supreme Court that established that “the right to health derives from the right
to life, thereby recognizing a right to medicine among the underprivileged” and sick).
212 See, e.g., Jorge Contesse, Resisting the Inter-American Human Rights System, 44 YALE J. INT’L
L. 179 (2019); Alexandra Huneeus, Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons From The Inter-American Court’s
Struggle To Enforce Human Rights, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493 (2011); Press Release, Colom. Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Comunicado de prensa del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores sobre el Sistema
Interamericano
de
Derechos
Humanos
(Apr.
24,
2019),
available
at
https://id.presidencia.gov.co/Paginas/prensa/2019/190424-Comunicado-de-prensa-del-Ministerio-deRelaciones-Exteriores-sobre-el-Sistema-Interamericano-de-Derechos-Humanos.aspx (requesting, in
part, that the Inter-American System’s reparations be more “proportionate” and respect the “realities” of
the States). See also infra Part III(D)(2) (discussing development projects on indigenous lands); Ximena
Soley and Silvia Steininger, Parting Ways or Lashing Back? Withdrawals, Backlash and the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, 14 INT’L J. L. IN CONTEXT 237 (2018); René Urueña, Double or
Nothing? The Inter-American Court of Human Rights in an Increasingly Adverse Context, 35 WIS. INT’L
L.J. 398 (2018).
213 This research takes into account the summaries of arguments provided by the Court in its
judgments.
214 See, e.g., Villagrán Morales v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63; Mapiripán
Massacre v. Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 134.
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vida digna; however, they disputed a violation in the specific situation.215 In
the notable case Gonzales Lluy v. Ecuador, during a public hearing the State
accepted responsibility for certain facts, and “offered” to the victim “a decent
life [vida digna], health, education, a public apology” and “decent
housing . . . to ensure [her] right to life.”216
Although States cannot appeal Court judgments, they can request an
interpretation of the decision.217 Occasionally, States attempt to challenge
judgments by this means.218 As of this writing, there have been no
interpretation judgments on the right to vida digna.219 In contrast, after the
Lagos del Campo decision, Peru promptly asked the Court why it assessed a
right to “job stability” in the case, and argued that the Article 26 violation
was not justified.220
On the other hand, States have not always complied promptly with
socio-cultural reparations in the Court’s judgments on vida digna.221 It is true
that Villagrán Morales’ limited remedies in this area were completed.222 But
215 See, e.g., Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245,
¶ 235 (“[T]he State reiterated that it cannot be claimed that the impact of the oil company’s activities has
caused serious harm to the conditions required for a decent life for the Sarayaku.”); Sawhoyamaxa
Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 147(c) (“Within the limitations of
a relatively less developed country . . . the State has created the conditions necessary to guarantee a decent
life for these indigenous populations, providing periodical food and sanitary assistance . . . .”).
216 Gonzales Lluy v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 298, ¶ 45. In another relevant case,
Ortiz Hernández v. Venezuela, the State declared that it would take various measures to “ensure
conditions of dignified life to the victim and family members, attending fully to their duly determined
socio-economic needs.” Ortiz Hernández v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 338, ¶ 219 (Aug. 22, 2017) (translation by author).
217 See American Convention, supra note 36, art. 67 (“The judgment of the Court shall be final and
not subject to appeal. In case of disagreement as to the meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court shall
interpret it at the request of any of the parties, provided the request is made within ninety days from the
date of notification of the judgment.”).
218 The Court has emphasized that interpretation requests “should not be used as a means of
contesting” or modifying the judgment. See, e.g., Abrill Alosilla v. Peru, Interpretation of the Judgment
on Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 235, ¶ 10 (Nov. 21, 2011); Fernández
Ortega v. Mexico, Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 224, ¶ 11 (May 15, 2011).
219 See, e.g., Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Interpretation of the Judgment on Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 142 (Feb. 6, 2006) (refraining from discussing
the right to vida digna).
220 Lagos del Campo v. Peru, Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 366, ¶ 13 (Nov. 21, 2018).
221
For official information regarding State compliance, see Inter-American Court of Human
Rights,
Monitoring
Compliance
with
Judgment,
available
at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/cf/Jurisprudencia2/busqueda_supervision_cumplimiento.cfm?lang=en.
222 Villagrán Morales v. Guatemala, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order of the Court,
2009 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., “Having Seen,” ¶¶ 3–4 (Jan. 27, 2009) (finding Guatemala complied with
monetary reparations, as well as orders to reform legislation, to assist with a victim’s burial, and to
“designate an educational center with a name allusive to the young victims in this case and place, in this
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the Court’s sweeping orders to provide medical and psychological treatment
to numerous victims in Juvenile Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay and
Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia223 have not yet been fulfilled, nor have
Juvenile Reeducation Institute’s vocational training programs.224
As for the indigenous community cases against Paraguay, the Court
required, among other measures, the return of traditional territories,
community development funds, and “the provision of basic goods and
services necessary for the subsistence of community members.”225 According
to official Court documents, Paraguay has not yet completed all of these
reparations; however, the Sawhoyamaxa and Xákmok Kásek communities
have returned to their lands, and authorities have provided potable water,
food, and medical attention.226 In these cases, it is difficult to conclude that
compliance delays prove a principled opposition to the right to a dignified
life.227 In general, States often take significant time to fulfill Court
reparations, especially if they require substantial financial resources,
political will, or technical expertise.228

center, a plaque with [their] names”; however, it has not adequately investigated and punished the
responsible parties); 12 Guatemalan Cases, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order of the Court,
2015 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 24, 2015).
223 Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order of the Court,
2012 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., “Declares,” ¶ 5 (Nov. 23, 2012) (Among other measures, Colombia also has
not completed orders to build a memorial for the massacre or to ensure that the displaced villagers can
safely return); Juvenile Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order
of the Court, 2009 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., “Declares,” ¶ 2 (Nov. 19, 2009); Press Release, Inter-American
Court, Corte Interamericana realiza visita al Paraguay para supervisar cumplimiento de sentencias, CP46/17 (Dec. 7, 2017), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/comunicados/cp_46_17.pdf (indicating that the
Court was formally inquiring into the medical/psychological and vocational reparations, among others,
during its visit to Paraguay).
224 Juvenile Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay, Order of the Court, 2009 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
“Declares,” ¶ 2.
225 The Cases of the Yakye Axa, Sawhoyamaxa and Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Communities v.
Paraguay, Monitoring Compliance with Judgments, Order of the Court, 2017 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
“Resolves,” ¶ 3 (Aug. 30, 2017).
226 See Press Release, Inter-American Court, Corte Interamericana realiza visita al Paraguay para
supervisar
cumplimiento
de
sentencias,
CP-46/17
(Dec.
7,
2017),
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/comunicados/cp_46_17.pdf., (“The Yakye Axa community continues
living in a reduced space on the side of the road . . . and not in the lands that must be delivered to them.
The Sawhoyamaxa and Xákmok Kásek communities are living on their traditional lands, which still have
not been titled.”) (translation by author); Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Order of the
Court, 2019 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., “Resolves,” ¶ 2–4 (indicating progress and delays with reparations);
Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Order of the Court, 2008 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., “Declares”
(Feb. 8, 2008) (same).
227 It should be noted that none of these compliance orders made reference to or discussed vida digna.
228 See Thomas M. Antkowiak, An Emerging Mandate for International Courts: Victim-Centered
Remedies and Restorative Justice, 47 STAN. J. INT’L L. 279 (2011); Caroline Bettinger-López, The
Challenge of Domestic Implementation of International Human Rights Law in the Cotton Field Case, 15
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In sum, it appears very unlikely that, at the time of its adoption, the
American Convention contained extensive positive obligations to ensure a
dignified life. Yet a regional commitment has been increasingly articulated
to secure dignified living conditions for the inhabitants of the Americas. The
emergence of a right to a dignified life, especially through the InterAmerican Court’s case law, has pushed this commitment to become more
concrete and justiciable. Latin American States have apparently not opposed
this conceptual evolution, and they also did not object when the Human
Rights Committee recently endorsed “the right to life with dignity.”229
Certainly, however, significant effort will be required to further develop and
implement this right in the national law and practice of the region.
D.

Institutional Aspects

1. Challenges with courts adjudicating social rights in general
This section considers various institutional issues encountered when
courts adjudicate social rights in general, and when the Inter-American Court
specifically applies human dignity to the right to life. One of the major,
longstanding objections to social rights concerns the role of judges in their
interpretation and enforcement.230 By adjudicating these rights, courts
become more involved in determining socio-economic policies and
allocating limited governmental resources.231
Granting an unaccountable body too much authority in this arena could
“empt[y] the democratic process of its necessary content, preventing . . . vital

CUNY L. REV. 315, 317–18 (2012); CARLOS M. BERISTAIN, DIÁLOGOS SOBRE LA REPARACIÓN:
EXPERIENCIAS EN EL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, VOL. II 531 (2008).
229 The only Latin American State to submit observations on the Human Rights Committee’s draft
general comment was Brazil, in order to condemn the use of nuclear weapons. See U.N. Human Rights
Comm., General Comment No. 36 on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights—Right
to
life,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/GC36Article6Righttolife.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2019).
230 See, e.g., ARYEH NEIER, THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT: A HISTORY 81
(2012) (explaining that the “main criticism” of social rights is that efforts to address inequality and
poverty “should focus on the political process” and “democratic decision-making” and not on the courts).
Other objections to social rights include that they are too expensive, too vague, encourage laziness,
penalize the creation of wealth, undermine economic growth, and grant too much power to the State. See
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty, supra note 19, ¶ 65; Bernard Duhaime, Le Système
Interaméricain et la Protection des Droits Économiques, Sociaux et Culturels des Personnes et des
Groupes Vivant dans des Conditions Particulières de Vulnérabilité, 44 CAN. Y.B. INT’L LAW 95, 131–
35 (2006) (reviewing several of these objections and considering whether they are fair or justified).
231 See, e.g., WICKS, supra note 68, at 222 (“[T]he judiciary may regard itself as not best placed to
make decisions about allocating resources.”); Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive
Duties and Positive Rights, PUB. L. 498, 512 (2006) (“Positive duties are often thought to be better suited
to the political than the judicial arena, because decision-makers are accountable to the electorate for their
decisions as to how to balance competing claims on resources.”).
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debates about the minimum substance of social and economic protection.”232
In some nations, judicial intervention has been ambitious and could create
unexpected imbalances and financial burdens.233 For example, if a court
orders a sizable community development fund whose amount is
disproportionate to local realities, this could create financial strain that will
hinder the State’s ability to assist similar communities, as well as to protect
social rights in general.
Similarly, critics argue that courts lack the technical capacity and
expertise to define and enforce social rights.234 Some judges themselves have
shown reluctance “to perform the roles required to promote the deeper
understanding of economic and social rights and their implementation by
diverse governmental agencies.”235 In fact, the South African Constitutional
Court stated that it was “not institutionally equipped to make the wideranging factual and political inquiries necessary for determining the
minimum-core standards [for a right to health care], nor for deciding how
public revenues should most effectively be spent.”236
A different concern involves the position of judges in society. If judges
enjoy elite socio-economic status, can they be trusted to endanger their own
privileges to increase protections for the poor and marginalized?237
Especially in this context, public interest litigation can potentially result in
judgments that narrow rights and “impede rather than facilitate
transformation.”238
232

Young, supra note 167, at 160.
Alexandra Huneeus observes that high courts in several nations have ordered “significant reform
of how government provides particular services,” but notes that it is uncertain “under what circumstances
such rulings are effective in altering the distribution of material and symbolic goods in a society.”
Alexandra Huneeus, Reforming the State from Afar: Structural Reform Litigation at the Human Rights
Courts, 40 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2015). See also MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE:
INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 310 (1990) (discussing unintended effects of judicial
decisions).
234 See, e.g., David Landau, The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 189, 194
(2012); Frank I. Michelman, The Constitution, Social Rights, and Liberal Political Justification, 1 INT’L
J. CONST. L. 13 (2003); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 223
(2001).
235 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty, supra note 19, ¶ 36.
236 Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, Case No. CCT 8/02, Judgment, ¶ 27 (Const.
Ct. July 5, 2002).
237 It is acknowledged that wealthy elites are in the legislatures as well as the courts. Furthermore,
of course, not all judges are either elite or unelected.
238 SANDRA LIEBENBERG, SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS: ADJUDICATION UNDER A TRANSFORMATIVE
CONSTITUTION 77–78 (2010). See also Neuman 2, supra note 167, at 1893 (“Constitutionalizing the rights
and giving a small legal elite final power to interpret them may obstruct rather than facilitate that
debate.”); Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty, supra note 19, ¶ 65 (explaining that “the
biggest challenge by far is essentially ideological . . . [t]he economic and political power of entrenched
elites is best protected by policies that marginalize ESC rights.”).
233
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Many of these challenges are compounded when supranational courts
adjudicate social, economic, and cultural rights. Inter-American Court
judges, for example, are unaccountable to the region’s populace; only one
sitting judge, at maximum, can be nominated by any specific nation’s
government.239 International judges, often affluent, may not be deeply
familiar (or sympathetic) with the specific socio-economic difficulties and
capabilities of the States that come before them. Further, supranational courts
have less access to evidence and fact-finding mechanisms than their national
counterparts.240 It is not surprising, then, that several States resisted the
Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, which provides for an individual petition
system.241 David Marcus noted that “even robust welfare states with active
judiciaries balk[ed] at the prospect of analogous international
adjudication.”242
Still other institutional complications may arise with the supranational
litigation of social rights, such as possible conflicts among peer tribunals. In
the Council of Europe, both the European Court and the European Social
Committee could potentially examine these rights. As for the United Nations
System, numerous authorities in addition to the Human Rights Committee
could interpret and monitor social rights, with the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights serving as the primary treaty body.243 Concerns
about overreaching likely have contributed to cautious approaches from the
European Court, and even the Human Rights Committee before 2018.244
Nevertheless, numerous constitutions across the globe—including in
the Americas—have established social rights as justiciable.245 Increasingly,

239 See American Convention, supra note 36, art. 52(2) (“No two judges may be nationals of the
same state.”).
240 See, e.g., Nancy Amoury Combs, From Prosecutorial to Reparatory: A Valuable Post-Conflict
Change of Focus, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 219, 234–39 (2015) (explaining fact-finding difficulties for
international criminal tribunals); James L. Cavallaro & Stephanie Erin Brewer, Reevaluating Regional
Human Rights Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of the Inter-American Court, 102 AM. J.
INT’L L. 768, 803–08 (2008) (describing fact-finding limitations for the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights).
241 See David Marcus, The Normative Development of Socioeconomic Rights through Supranational
Adjudication, 42 STAN. J. INT’L L. 53, 65–66 (2006) (citing the objections of Argentina, Italy, Germany,
and India).
242 Id. at 65.
243 Numerous United Nations treaty bodies, Special Procedures, and other authorities could
potentially analyze social rights. For a helpful presentation of these many human rights mechanisms, see
generally Jane Connors, United Nations, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 369–410 (Daniel
Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah & Sandesh Sivakumaran eds., 2018).
244 These approaches are discussed in Part I(C), supra.
245 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty, supra note 19, ¶ 33; SUNSTEIN, supra
note 234, at 221 (“A remarkable feature of international opinion—indeed a near consensus—is that
socioeconomic rights deserve constitutional protection.”).
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national courts have shown themselves capable of interpreting and
developing these rights.246 As constitutional provisions are translated into
statutes and regulations, States must require further training and education
for their judges in this complex, multi-disciplinary field. Although it may be
preferable for solutions to be pursued through various non-judicial means, if
such means prove ineffective, a court must ultimately be available to remedy
violations of rights established by law.
As for controversies surrounding the supranational adjudication of
social rights, at least in the Inter-American System States have not rejected
the Court’s right to a dignified life, despite the challenges involved.247 As
mentioned above, several nations have also expressly granted the Court and
the Inter-American Commission, through the San Salvador Protocol,
jurisdiction over individual petitions alleging violations of the rights to
unions and education.248 Further, potential conflicts are less of an issue in the
Americas, which rely only on the Commission and the Court in this domain.
As the “sole judicial organ” of the American Convention, the Court has the
authority to review the Commission’s decisions concerning this treaty.249
2. Challenges with courts adjudicating the right to a dignified life
specifically
Certainly, there are risks associated with the litigation of socioeconomic rights. Not only could a hostile or untrained judge distort their
content, but court procedures themselves may also substantially alter the
rights and their corresponding obligations. The varied limits of justiciability,
246 See, e.g., Varun Gauri & Daniel M. Brinks, Introduction: The Elements of Legalization and the
Triangular Shape of Social and Economic Rights, in COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE: JUDICIAL
ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 6 (Varun Gauri & Daniel
M. Brinks eds., 2008) (observing that, “under the right conditions,” courts have advanced social and
economic rights); Malcolm Langford, The Justiciability of Social Rights: From Practice to Theory, in
SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 37, at 3 (“In a significant number of jurisdictions, adjudicatory bodies have intervened to
protect a wide range of social rights”); Katharine G. Young, Introduction, in THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 1–33 (Katharine G. Young ed., 2019) (presenting global trends of a “juridical
revolution” in economic and social rights).
247 Yet the region may be less receptive to the Court’s aggressive position on Article 26, initiated by
Lagos del Campo v. Peru.
248 In the Inter-American System, the Inter-American Commission also has jurisdiction over the
social, economic, and cultural rights established in the American Declaration. See, e.g., Hul’qumi’num
Treaty Group v. Canada, Case 12.734, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 105/09, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.,
doc. 51, corr. ¶ 4 (2009) (concluding that the petition is admissible with regard to alleged violations of,
among others, Article XIII (Right to the benefits of culture) of the American Declaration); Mitchell v.
Canada, Case 12.435, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 61/08, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.134, doc. 5 rev. ¶¶
67–83 (2008) (assessing an alleged violation of the American Declaration’s Article XIII).
249 See e.g., 19 Merchants v. Colombia, Preliminary Objection, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 93, ¶ 27 (June 12, 2002); Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 1, ¶ 29 (June 26, 1987).
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remedies, standing, ripeness, mootness, and the political question doctrine
all can restrict the full expression of rights.250
Hallowed principles of human dignity and life, however one defines
them, are no different. As soon as they are interpreted by courts, they can be
diminished, or perhaps made too powerful. Commentators have warned that
codifying or co-opting dignity in law can deprive it of alternative, or fuller,
meanings.251
When the right to life transforms into the right to a dignified life, as in
the Inter-American System, select socio-economic rights are assimilated into
life. Such a significant shift leads to immediate questions, confusion, and
likely unintended consequences. First, what is the precise content of this
metaright, and how can courts draw a line? As in the case of certain domestic
tribunals, the Inter-American Court has identified specific social, economic
and cultural elements that it believes are intrinsic to the right to life. As
reviewed above, these elements currently consist of water, nutrition, health,
housing, education, and ancestral lands (in the case of indigenous peoples).
When the State “has not provided the basic assistance necessary” to fulfill
these needs, the Court has found a violation of the right to a dignified life.252
Yet several would find fault with this attempt to identify basic
requirements for a dignified life.253 If the Inter-American Court sets the bar
low and merely supports survival—however that is understood—it neglects
dignity’s potential to seek human prosperity. Under a basic needs approach,
many in society will remain vulnerable, in “drastic material inequality,”254
and perhaps as “passive . . . recipients of predefined services rather than as
agents involved in interpreting their needs and shaping their life
conditions.”255 Of course, there is also disagreement as to which human needs
should be considered essential under this approach, and how minimal levels
should be determined. For similar reasons, the United Nations Committee on
250 See Young, supra note 167, at 161; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability
and Remedies—and Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 685–86 (2006).
251 See Tina Beattie, A Theological Reflection on Revelation, Law, and Human Dignity, in
UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 178, at 271 (by “co-opting” dignity, the law “drains it of
any alternative meaning.”).
252 Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 217.
253 For an excellent critique of a minimum core approach, see generally Young, supra note 167.
Amartya Sen has explained that even the requirements of survival remain ambiguous: “There is difficulty
in drawing a line somewhere, and the so-called ‘minimum nutritional requirements’ have an inherent
arbitrariness that goes well beyond variations between groups and regions.” AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY
AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT AND DEPRIVATION 12 (1981).
254 MOYN, supra note 9, at 213 (“[T]here turns out to be no contradiction between drastic material
inequality and fulfillment of basic provision.”).
255 Young, supra note 167, at 132 (citing NANCY FRASER, UNRULY PRACTICES: POWER, DISCOURSE
AND GENDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY 174 (1989)).
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has encountered resistance to its
concept of a State’s “minimum core obligation,” which seeks to establish
“minimum essential levels” of food, health care, housing, and education.256
Second, there are worries that the right to life can actually be debilitated
by the vida digna judicial interpretation. If the right to life expands to include
a bundle of social, economic, and cultural elements, a court will likely find
the right violated more frequently. This could result in “norm dilution,”
weakening the meaning of the right to life.257 If copious new elements are
absorbed by life, the right’s content may also become unwieldy and
unrecognizable.258 Further, it is recalled that social rights need only be
achieved by States progressively, and can be limited in emergency
situations.259 If courts integrate social rights into life, could this compromise
the right to life’s non-derogable and immediately-enforceable
characteristics?
Third, savvy litigants and judges take calculated advantage of the force
and elusive content of human dignity and dignified life. These principles are
used as a trump card, in order to call attention to a case, jump the queue to
justice, and defeat other claims and arguments.260 At the very least, dignity

256 U.N. CESCR, 5th Sess., General Comment 3 ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990)
(hereinafter General Comment 3). For more on how the Committee on Economic and Social Rights
establishes State responsibility for violations of these rights, see Diane A. Desierto and Colin E.
Gillespie, A Modern Integrated Paradigm for International Responsibility Arising from Violations of
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 3 CAMBRIDGE J. OF INT’L AND COMP. LAW 556–595 (2014).
257 Tara J. Melish, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Beyond Progressivity, in SOCIAL
RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
37, at 372, 407 (discussing a “threat of serious norm dilution” in reference to Article 4 of the Convention);
Tara J. Melish, Rethinking the “Less As More” Thesis: Supranational Litigation of Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights in the Americas, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 171, 326 (2006) (similar). See also
Cismas, supra note 8, at 472 (also concerned with dilution of rights); Kichwa Indigenous People of
Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 235 (“The State considered that, within the
system of guarantees established in the Convention, the right to life has priority and, therefore, the cases
in which the State can be declared responsible for the violation of this right for having failed to respond
with due diligence are very exceptional.”).
258 See Melish, supra note 257, at 326 (“These concepts are of potentially illimitable scope, capable
of subsuming into their protective embrace virtually all nationally and internationally recognized human
rights.”); Christian Tomuschat, The Right to Life—Legal and Political Foundations, in THE RIGHT TO
LIFE, supra note 51, at 10 (“Stretching the right to life extensively, one could derive from it most of the
rights set forth in the ICESCR.”).
259 See General Comment 3, ¶¶ 1, 10 (explaining “progressive realization” and stating “it must be
noted that any assessment as to whether a State has discharged its minimum core obligation must also
take account of resource constraints applying within the country concerned.”).
260 See Cismas, supra note 8, at 462 (“the competition among these rights to make use of the same
right to life as a justiciable device is important . . . [a]nd thus, ‘queue jumping’ . . . is facilitated.”); James
L. Cavallaro & Emily Schaffer, Rejoinder: Justice Before Justiciability: Inter-American Litigation and
Social Change, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 345, 382 (2006) (“The key . . . is to find ways to use this
right-to-life focus to advance other aspects of social justice campaigns—including ESC rights.”); James
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will often be employed to reinforce the reasoning for a range of rights
violations.261 In this context, some scholars urge courts to assess and balance
discrete rights only, rather than amorphous concepts that envelop “moral and
legal propositions whose substance originates elsewhere.”262 Otherwise, an
arms race can ensue, with one version of dignity pitted against another.263
Like the right to life, the concept of dignity faces the danger of being pulled
in multiple directions until it rips apart.
Fourth, even some social rights advocates would disapprove of the
Inter-American Court’s right to a dignified life. Subsuming social rights
under a classic civil right may suggest inferiority. If social rights are only
useful because they enable or support civil and political rights, this indicates
that they are subordinate to their more accepted counterparts.264 Does this
approach simply reaffirm the traditional hierarchies in the international
human rights movement?
Assessing social, economic and cultural rights on their own merits, not
dependent upon the right to life, offers another advantage. Disaggregating
these various rights from vida digna facilitates their individualized
development.265 They are important rights and they deserve intricate
elaboration. Major effort, and constant input from victims, stakeholders, and
experts from various disciplines, are demanded for judges to further refine
the contours of these rights.
Finally, potential State resistance to these concepts, and possible
damage to the Inter-American human rights institutions, should be further
L. Cavallaro & Emily J. Schaffer, Less as More: Rethinking Supranational Litigation of Economic and
Social Rights in the Americas, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 217, 272 (2004).
261 See Jean-Paul Costa, Human Dignity in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 178, at 400 (explaining the approach of the
European Court “to use the concept of human dignity to reinforce the reasoning leading to a violation of
the Convention” or to reject complaints incompatible with human dignity).
262 Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 577 (1982) (referring to the
concept of equality). See also Conor Gearty, Socio-Economic Rights, Basic Needs, and Human Dignity:
A Perspective from Law’s Front Line, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 178, at 169
(arguing for the analysis and balancing of specific rights).
263 Dignity has been established as an operative right, as opposed to a foundational principle, in the
domestic law of select countries. In these nations, such as Germany and Israel, more specific
interpretations often have emerged.
264 See WALDRON, supra note 175, at 10–11 (explaining that this argument concedes priority to civil
and political rights).
265 See Tara J. Melish, Rethinking the “Less As More” Thesis: Supranational Litigation of Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights in the Americas, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 171, 328 (“[S]upranational
litigation of economic, social, and cultural rights [should seek to preserve] the distinct identity and
dimensionality of each internationally-recognized human right.”); Suárez Peralta v. Ecuador, Preliminary
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 261 (May 21,
2013) (concurring opinion of Judge Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor Poisot, ¶ 57) (arguing for the
independent development of the right to health, apart from the right to life).
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examined. In these tumultuous times, both regional and international rights
mechanisms have confronted backlash.266 While States have not appeared to
challenge the Court’s evolving right to a dignified life, other pertinent
developments in the Inter-American System should be considered.
In 2011, a decision by the Inter-American Commission to issue nonbinding precautionary measures unleashed a torrent of State protest.267 The
Commission requested that Brazil halt construction on the Belo Monte
hydroelectric power plant, a major project that endangered indigenous
communities of the Xingu River Basin.268 As a result of this decision and
others, a group of States led a “reform” movement that ultimately restricted
the Commission’s powers.269
The Commission has continued to issue precautionary measures to
protect communities who face threats to their lives and health, although the
process is now slower and more cumbersome.270 The right to a dignified life
was not expressly invoked in the Belo Monte proceedings or in these more
recent cases. It certainly could have been, however, and one wonders
whether States will support this expansive right when it requires them to stop
resource extraction initiatives and other lucrative development projects.271
266 See, e.g., Contesse, supra note 212, at 190 (“Human rights law has been particularly affected by
the broader pushback against international law.”); Monika Hakimi, International Law in “Turbulent
Times,” Part I, EJILTALK! (March 6, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/international-law-in-turbulenttimes-part-i/ (noting, however, that “the conflicts that occur through international law are not necessarily
evidence of its weakness or dysfunction”), available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/international-law-inturbulent-times-part-i/; Karen J. Alter, James T. Gathii and Laurence R. Helfer, Backlash Against
International Courts in West, East, and Southern Africa: Causes and Consequences, 27 EUR. J. INT’L. L.
293–328 (2016).
267 Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Precautionary Measures: Indigenous Communities of the Xingu River
Basin,
Pará,
Brazil,
PM
382/10
(Apr.
1,
2011),
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/indigenous/protection/precautionary.asp.
268 Id.
269 See, e.g., Claudia Martin & Diego Rodríguez-Pinzón, Strengthening or Straining the InterAmerican System on Human Rights, in THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THEORY AND
PRACTICE, PRESENT AND FUTURE, supra note 191, at 795, 795–822; Daniel Cerqueira, Brazil, Ecuador,
and the Inter-American Human Rights System, AMERICAS Q., (Mar. 6, 2015),
http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/brazil-ecuador-and-inter-american-human-rights-system;
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Res. 1/2013, Reform of the Rules of Procedure, Policies and Practices (Mar. 18,
2013), reprinted in Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/RuleslACHR2013.pdf (last
visited Nov. 5, 2019).
270 For recent resolutions on precautionary measures, see, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Precautionary Measure No. 43–18, Guatemala (June 18, 2018), available at
http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/decisiones/pdf/2018/43-18MC44-18-GU.pdf; Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Precautionary
Measure
No.
12–18,
Honduras
(Feb.
24,
2018),
available
at
http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/decisiones/pdf/2018/12-18MC772-17-HO.pdf.
271 Here we could expect one version of vida digna used against another. The State could argue that,
with such developmental projects, it is pursuing a dignified life for the general population.
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And, one wonders, would the State dare to defy a binding Court injunction
in this situation, or only Commission recommendations? Up until now, the
Court has unsurprisingly shown caution when considering emergency
petitions in this delicate context.272 Fully committing to vida digna in this
scenario will put the Court on a collision course with States, a path that risks
weakening the Court’s institutional stability.273
3. Institutional advantages to the Court’s vida digna approach
International courts strive to uphold the principle of effectiveness,
whereby treaty provisions should be interpreted in a way that allows them to
be effective.274 One major institutional advantage of the vida digna doctrine
is that it seeks to render the American Convention’s Article 4 more effective.
Serious poverty, sickness, and vulnerability in Latin America result in
millions of deaths and directly undermine the right to life.275 By devising the
right to a dignified life, the Court finds a way to better protect both the
endangered individuals and communities who come before it, as well as
many others across the Americas.
Rights without remedies, of course, are almost meaningless; a tribunal
must design a remedy that seeks to directly restore the infringed right. 276
272 See Saramaka People v. Suriname, Order of the Court, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Sep. 4, 2013)
(rejecting the Saramaka community’s request for provisional measures, but requiring “a complete,
detailed and specific report on the alleged award of the mining concession on the Saramaka territory.”);
Four Ngöbe Indigenous Cmtys. v. Panama, Order of the Court, 2010 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (May 28, 2010)
(finding that the request for provisional measures to protect ancestral lands was not substantiated).
273 Another possible flashpoint could involve the surging numbers of Venezuelan refugees who have
fled to several nations in the region. Will States be able to provide these millions of migrants with
dignified living conditions? For more on the rights of migrants in the Inter-American System, see
generally Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18 (Sept. 17, 2003); Sarah Paoletti, Human Rights for All Workers: The
Emergence of Protections for Unauthorized Workers in the Inter-American Human Rights System, HUM.
RTS. BRIEF, 5, 6 (2004).
274 See Neuman 2, supra note 167, at 1871; J.G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 98 (2d ed. 1993); Hersch Lauterpacht, Restrictive
Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L.
48, 67–69 (1949).
275 By 2030, approximately 69 million children will die before their fifth birthday from mostly
preventable causes. UNICEF, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S CHILDREN 2015: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY,
https://www.unicef.org/publications/files/SOWC_2015_Summary_and_Tables.pdf. According to the
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, in 2017 “the number of people living in
poverty in the region reached 184 million (30.2% of the population), of whom 62 million live in extreme
poverty (10.2% of the population, the highest percentage since 2008),” COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA
AND
THE
CARIBBEAN,
SOCIAL
PANORAMA
OF
LATIN
AMERICA:
2018,
https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/44396/4/S1900050_en.pdf.
276 See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 281 (2000)
(stating that rights are inextricable from remedies: they “cannot sensibly be crafted apart from remedies,
or vice versa.”); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
857 (1999) (commenting that rights and remedies are “interdependent and inextricably intertwined”). The
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When the Court expressly tied various socio-cultural elements to life, it
justified a proportional expansion in reparations, such as housing, water,
health, cultural, and educational projects. A traditional interpretation of the
Convention’s civil and political rights would disregard such remedies, which
have been requested and proven necessary by numerous victims before the
Court.277
To illustrate, in a situation like that of the Yakye Axa community, the
Court could limit itself to finding violations of the rights to collective
property and due process.278 It then likely would order a return of the
communal lands and some degree of monetary compensation. However,
finding a vida digna violation substantiates wider remedies such as medical
attention, as well as shipments of food and potable water. In such a crisis
situation, these measures are indispensable to protect the community
members and safeguard the right to life.
Violations to the Convention’s Article 26 will also lead to socio-cultural
remedies. Testing the waters with the right to vida digna likely gave the
Court confidence to dive deeper into the Lagos line of cases. But, for reasons
discussed above, the use of Article 26 is more controversial to States than
the right-to-life approach, and may provoke ire—especially if the Court
relies on the provision to order extensive reparations. Thus, utilizing the right
to vida digna over an Article 26 approach seems to offer an institutional
advantage to the Inter-American Court.279
As for diluting the right to life’s meaning, these concerns are reasonable
given the potential scope of vida digna. However, as reviewed above, over
enduring international legal principle of restitutio in integrum provides that “reparation must, as far as
possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all
probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.” Factory at Chorzów (Germ. v. Pol.), 1928
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47 (Sept. 13, 1928).
277 The Court has also provided these socio-cultural remedies in judgments that involved collective
property violations and not a breach of the right to vida digna. However, as I have argued elsewhere,
many of those expansive reparations programs better correspond to the fuller right to a dignified life than
to a simple right to property. See Thomas M. Antkowiak, Rights, Resources, and Rhetoric: Indigenous
Peoples and the Inter-American Court, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 113, 181 (2013) (“If indigenous norms are
located in a multidimensional right to life, multifaceted reparations are facilitated . . . [i]n contrast,
tethering varied indigenous rights to Article 21 could limit communities to typical property remedies and
nothing more.”).
278 This assumes a situation where no deaths have yet occurred; with any right-to-life violation, the
reparations will necessarily become more substantial.
279 In addition, an individualized approach to developing a range of social rights will likely require
more effort, research, and argumentation by both the Court and petitioners. While these are worthy
endeavors, assuming the Court has jurisdiction to do so, it should be acknowledged that saving the Court
some of these efforts under the vida digna approach has resulted in an institutional advantage. See
Neuman 1, supra note 167, at 114–16 (pointing out that approaches to save courts time and effort provide
institutional advantages, although they should also be balanced with consensual and suprapositive
considerations).
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the last twenty years the Inter-American Court has issued less than ten
judgments on the right to a dignified life. Recently, it shows even more
restraint in considering the principle. As a result, it would appear that worries
about norm dilution have not been realized.
Similarly, the content and requirements of vida digna have not
expanded to unmanageable dimensions. The Court has not extended the right
beyond the modest parameters outlined in the 2010 judgment Xákmok Kásek
Indigenous Community.280 Still, there is enough case law to guide States and
to promote the rights of at-risk individuals and communities in the
Americas.281
Of course, litigation approaches of human rights advocates and the
Inter-American Commission can change. Additional cases on the right to a
dignified life will inevitably compel the Court to define its standards of risk,
as well as to further detail minimum levels of food, water, health, shelter,
and education. But a massive surge in petitions, in theory possible due to
widespread poverty in Latin America, could present serious risks to the InterAmerican System’s integrity.282
At that point, institutional considerations would counsel some
narrowing of the right. The Commission and Court could make it more
challenging for petitioners not belonging to traditionally-vulnerable groups
to demonstrate State liability.283 Multiple cases may also be joined, and the
Court could choose to emphasize structural and non-monetary remedies—
for efficiency, and to save States the significant expense of individual cash
damages.284 Fortunately, such limitations have not yet occurred; the Court’s

280

See Neuman 1, supra note 167.
There is much debate about the extent to which national authorities should directly apply the
American Convention and the Court’s case law, a concept known as “conventionality control.” See, e.g.,
García Ramírez, supra note 205, at 137–48; Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor, Reflexiones Sobre el Control
Difuso de Convencionalidad a la Luz del Caso Cabrera García y Montiel Flores vs. México, 131 UNAM,
INSTITUTO DE INVESTIGACIONES JURÍDICAS 917 (2011) (Mex.).
282 Of course, the use of the petition system before the Inter-American Commission and Court
generally requires exhaustion of domestic remedies. Further, litigation before this System and other
international mechanisms is also expensive and slow; unfortunately, these realities will exclude many
destitute petitioners from accessing international justice.
283 See Pasqualucci, supra note 82, at 32 (proposing that such persons could “have a weightier burden
but would still have the possibility of bringing a case for the violation of a dignified life before the
Court.”).
284 The remedial model prioritizing non-monetary, forward-looking measures likely will be less
expensive than attempts at full economic compensation. See John C. Jeffries, The Right-Remedy Gap in
Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 109 (1999). But see Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92
YALE L.J. 585, 673 (1983) (arguing that, if courts reduce monetary reparations for such pragmatic
reasons, they should acknowledge that a full remedy has not been provided—to “leave[] open the
possibility that at some point the courts will be able to furnish a more complete remedy.”).
281
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current right to a dignified life stands as the authoritative formulation to lead
the region’s governments.
Finally, the argument remains that subsuming social rights under the
right to life reinforces the longstanding hierarchy of rights. Yet this position
neglects evolving international understandings of life. Contemporary views
advanced by human rights experts consider life to constitute a social right as
much as a civil right.285 Taken this way, vida digna is not just a strategy to
anchor marginalized social rights onto established civil rights, in order to
legitimize and protect the former. It is a manner of refining the content of a
critical and complex social right. The Inter-American Court’s interpretation
underscores that the evolving right to life integrally belongs to both spheres
of rights and in fact connects the two worlds.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Twenty years ago, the Inter-American Court introduced the right to a
dignified life to international human rights law. This expansive view of the
right to life was recently affirmed by the United Nations Human Rights
Committee. The Court has established that water, nutrition, health care,
housing, education, and ancestral lands all form part of a dignified life, and
has developed a broad State duty “to take positive, concrete measures” to
protect individuals and communities at risk. By taking a stand on vida digna,
the Inter-American Court recognized that life could not be meaningfully
separated from several social, cultural, and economic rights. In order to fully
protect the fundamental right to life, then, the Court needed to discern its
broad nature, as well as order proportionate, multi-faceted measures to
safeguard this right when threatened.
While any doctrine to protect human rights will suffer weaknesses, the
right to vida digna has proven overall to be a sensible approach for the InterAmerican Human Rights System, as it has reasonably balanced consensual,
suprapositive, and institutional factors. The right appeals to the powerful
suprapositive principle of human dignity, and, as applied by the Court, has
until now managed several institutional concerns capably. Although States
did not expressly agree to a right to a dignified life at the American
285 See, e.g., Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, supra note 51, ¶ 3 (asserting
that the right to life has “dimensions” of both social and civil rights); ESCR-Net, RECOGNIZING THE
INTERDEPENDENCE AND INDIVISIBILITY OF THE RIGHT TO LIFE WITH ESC RIGHTS ¶ 5 (2015),
https://www.escr-net.org/sites/default/files/escr-net_srac_gi_on_article_6.pdf (“[T]he right to life should
not be interpreted narrowly or deprived of its inherent connection to ESC rights.”); Villagrán Morales v.
Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63, ¶ 4 (Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges A.A. Cançado
Trindade and A. Abreu-Burelli) (“This outlook conceptualizes the right to life as belonging, at the same
time, to the domain of civil and political rights, as well as economic, social and cultural rights, thus
illustrating the interrelation and indivisibility of all human rights.”).
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Convention’s adoption, the concept has acquired meaning and force over the
years. Latin American States have not opposed its crystallization, likely
because it reflects their emphasis, at least in principle, on human dignity and
respectable living conditions.
A dynamic process of exchange among Inter-American Court judges,
victims of human rights abuse, governments, and experts will allow the right
to continue to evolve in a manner that respects the integrity of life, the values
of the region, and the consent of States. If the Court stays committed to this
process, it will steadily progress toward more protective and specific
requirements for a dignified life. The vida digna approach can also inspire
complementary methods to advance social rights and individually develop
their content—although the Court’s recent Article 26 approach, in particular,
may not adequately balance consensual, suprapositive, and institutional
elements.
As for the other regional human rights systems, the European Court,
rather than utilizing the right to life, has more often protected socioeconomic norms under the rights to humane treatment and private life. The
African Court has directly applied the various social, economic, and cultural
rights enumerated by the African Charter. These varied approaches certainly
are understandable, as these Courts interpret different treaties and represent
constituencies with distinct histories, traditions, cultures, and legal systems.
In any case, as legal institutions increasingly engage creative methods to
safeguard human dignity, they should closely contemplate the strong
affirmation by the Inter-American System, and now the Human Rights
Committee, of the indivisibility of rights and the fullness of life.
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